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HABEAS CORPUS IN ONTARIO
By EDWARD KOROWAY*
A.

INTRODUCTION
Rex vicecom. London salutem:
Praecipimus tibi, quod corpus A.B. in prisona nostra sub custodia tua detentum,
ut dicitur, una cum causa detentionis suae quocunque nomine idem A.B. conseatur in eadem habeas coram nobis apud Westm. die Jovis prox. post Octabis
S. Martini ad subjiciendum et recipiendum ea quae curia nostra de eo adtunc,
et ibidem ordinari contigerit in hac parte, et hoc, nullatemus, omittatis periculo
incumbente, et habeati ibi hoc breve.1

With these words the King commands the Sheriff to produce the body
of the prisoner being detained in his custody, together with the day and cause
of his caption and detention, "to submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge
2
or court awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf".
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the most famous of all the

writs of habeas corpus, 3 is a means of determining the validity of a person's
detention. It applies equally to cases of civil and criminal commitment. The
high visibility of the writ over the centuries evidences its great significance.
Because habeas corpus is so much a product of history, we shall begin
our review by examining its origins in England, together with the introduction of habeas corpus into Ontario. The federal nature of our country requires,
too, the consideration of issues related to legislative jurisdiction in this as
in all other areas of our law. The major emphasis will be on the use of
habeas corpus at various stages of the criminal process, though the noncriminal incidence of the writ is not to be ignored.

* Edward Koroway, LL.B. (Osgoode, 1974), presently studying at Oxford.
I wish to express my gratitude to Professors W.S. Tarnopolsky and P.W. Hogg
(both of Osgoode Hall Law School of York University) for the encouragement they
gave and the valuable suggestions they made while I was preparing this paper.
1F.H. Hurd, A Treatise on the Right of Personal Liberty, and on the Writ of
Habeas Corpus (2d ed. Albany: W.C. Little & Co., 1876) at 228-29. See, also, L.
Brunet, De l'Habeas Corpus ad Subiciendum en mati~re criminelle et civile (Montr6al:
C. Th6oret, 1901) at 34.
2 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 131.
3There are other writs of habeas corpus conveniently collected in 3 Blackstone's
Commentaries 129-31 as well as in Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., rev.) at 837-38.
Habeas corpus ad testificandum is now replaced by s. 460 of the Criminal Code. It is
also dealt with in Rule 232 and Form 59 of the Ontario Rules of Practice: see McGuire
v. McGuire and Desordi, [1953] O.R. 328 (C.A.).
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HISTORY

(1) The Common Law of England
The ancient writ of habeas corpus is common law in origin. As Rand, l.
puts it:
Its beginnings are shrouded in the dim past, but that it was recognized and en-

forced at common law is unquestioned. It arose at a time when the individual

was too often the victim of tyranny in public and private prisons and when the
King as the supreme lord might well be concerned about the fate of lieges.4

The precise date of origin is in dispute. Jenks claims its earliest use can
be found in the Royal Ordinance or Assize of Clarendon, issued by Henry II
in 1166.r In clause 4 of the Ordinance, the King directs the sheriff to "have
the bodies" of the accused before the Justice. Jenks feels it "hardly too
much to assume" that this message later became the habeas corpus ad
respondendum.6
Holdsworth writes that from Edward I's reign onwards, different writs
of habeas corpus were known to the law. The issue of a writ of habeas corpus
ad respondendum was one of the steps in the lengthy mesne process which
could be taken to secure the appearance of a defendant.7 Thus it has been
observed that whatever may have been its ultimate use, "the writ of Habeas
Corpus was originally intended not to get people out of prison, but to put
them in it".8 Habeas corpus was also used to summon the four knights for
the purpose of the Grand Assize or to summon a jury. But was there any
trace of the present use of the writ in the thirteenth century?
Pollock and Maitland indicate that the King's courts at Westminster
had not at that time concerned themselves with men "who have not been
sentenced to imprisonment but who are in prison"9 - that would suppose
"too perfect a centralization" in the thirteenth century. The central court had
control, in theory, over criminal justice and would sometimes direct a sheriff
to send up prisoners to Westminster for trial, although that was rare. While
the King's court had power to order that a man's body should be brought
before it and to liberate him if persuaded his detention was wrongful, no
4

1n Re Storgoff, [1945] S.C.R. 526; [1945] 3 D.L.R. 673; 84 C.C.C. 1 at 577-78
(S.C.R.); 721-22 (D.L.R.).
5
Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law (1923), 32 Yale L. J.523 at 524.
A thorough history of the writ may also be found in Cohen, Some Considerations on
the Origins of HabeasCorpus (1938), 16 C.B.R. 92; Habeas Corpus Cum Causa - The
Emergence of the Modern Writ (1940), 18 C.B.R. 10, 172. See, too, IJ. Marke, Five
Knights and The King (1973), 21 Ch. L. J. 101.
0
Jenks, supra, note 5 at 525. An old form of this writ may be found in Jenks as

well, at 525. The writ has now been replaced by s. 460 of the Criminal Code.
7
Holdsworth, 9 A History of English Law (2d ed. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.,
1938) at 108.
8 Marke,
supra, note 5 at 102.
0
Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of English Law (2d ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1898) at 586.
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definite machinery was provided for this purpose.' 0 Indeed, the central power
feared that there would not be enough, rather than that there would be too
much, imprisonment of suspected malefactors."
Holdsworth attributes the development of the writ to the desire of the
courts of common law to extend their jurisdiction at the expense of rival
courts. 12 He divides this development into two periods. The first was a contest
between the common law courts and the local and franchise courts. During
the fifteenth century, the writ of habeas corpus was used together with the
writ of certiorari to bring the proceedings and parties to an action in an
inferior court before the courts of common law. It was in this medieval period
that the writ became "a weapon by which the courts of common law could
both defend their own jurisdiction, and increase it at the expense of rival
jurisdictions".' 3
The second period began in the latter part of the fifteenth century and
continued throughout the sixteenth century. The rivalry here was between
the courts of common law and the rival central courts (Chancery, the Council
and Star Chamber, and Admiralty). The courts of common law used the
writ of habeas corpus to assert their jurisdiction by releasing persons committed by these rival central courts.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the writ began to branch out into
three categories: (a) ad respondendum, "when a man hath a cause of action
against one who is confined by the process of some inferior court; in order to
remove the prisoner, and charge him with this new action in the court
above";' 4 (b) ad subjiciendum et recipiendum, used when a man is detained
on a criminal charge to test the validity of his detention; and (c) ad faciendum
et recipiendum, used where a defendant in a civil action seeks to remove the
action from an inferior to a superior court. 15 It is habeas corpus ad subjiciendurn that came to be associated with the liberty of the subject by its
application to persons imprisoned by the Council. When so used, there was a
tendency to connect it with the clauses of Magna Carta that prohibited imprisonment without "due process" of law.' 6 But Holdsworth concludes that
"there is no historical connection between Magna
his analysis shows that
17
Carta and this writ".
Id.
" 7d.
12 Holdsworth, supra, note 7 at 109.
13 Id.
10

1

4Blackstone, supra, note 2 at 129.
15Hodsworth, supra, note 7 at 111.
16 The preamble to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640 reads as follows: "Whereas by
the great charter many times confirmed in parliament, it is enacted, That no freeman
shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold or liberties, or free customs,
or be outlawed or exiled or otherwise destroyed, and that the King will not pass upon
him, or condemn him; but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land .. " (16 Car. 1, c. 10). Clause 39 of Magna Carta is reproduced in Hurd, supra,
note 1 at 69.
17 Holdsworth, supra, note 7 at 112.
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Before outlining the statutory history of habeas corpus, a word might be
in order about the prerogative writs in general, and certiorari in particular the usual companion to habeas corpus. 18 Certiorari was essentially a royal
demand for information; from about 1280 the writ was in common use, issuing on the application of ordinary litigants to remove to the King's Courts at
Westminster the proceedings of inferior courts:
The theory is that the Sovereign has been appealed to by some one of his subjects who complains of an injustice done him by an inferior court; whereupon the
Sovereign, saying that he wishes to be certified - certiorari - of the matter,
orders that the record, etc., be transmitted into a court in which he is sitting.' 9

The breve, or "writ", was originally "a short written command issued
by a person in authority, and 'tested' or sealed by him in proof of its genuineness".,s The fact that a command was written in itself distinguished a writ
from mere spoken words in the days when writing was rare. All writs were
in form commands issuing in the Kings name, but only those which are conceived as standing in a special relationship with the Crown came to be known
as "prerogative" writs. 2' De Smith lists four general characteristics common
to these. First, they are not writs "of course": they cannot issue without

proper cause being shown to the satisfaction of a court, the distinction being
between writs "of course' and writs "of grace". The former had acquired a
common form and could be purchased by anyone from the Royal Chancery.m
Writs of grace issued only when cause was shown by the subject. But the
Crown would have a certiorari to remove an indictment as of course, since
the writ was in a special sense the King's own.2 3
Secondly, the award of the writs usually lies within the discretion of the
court. Certiorari and mandamus may be refused if the applicants are guilty of
laches, misconduct, or if an adequate alternative remedy exists. The fact that
some of the prerogative writs were discretionary came to be directly linked
with their designation as prerogative writs. Yet while none are writs of course,

prohibition issues as of right in certain cases;24 and habeas corpus ad

subjiciendum:
is a writ of right and is issued ex debito justitiae, upon it being shown that there
is ground for believing that the applicant is unlawfully held in custody, so that
the Court may inquire into the cause of his imprisonment and in a proper case
order his immediate release; but it is not a writ of course and may be refused
where an alternative remedy by which the validity of the detention can be
determined is available to the applicant.25
18 S. 5 of the Act of 1866 permits the issue of a writ of certiorari in aid of habeas
corpus. This issue is examined in Part E of this paper.
19 R. v. Titchmarsh (1915), 22 D.L.R. 272 at 277-78, as quoted by S.A. de Smith,
Tie PrerogativeWrits (1951), 11 Camb. L. J. 40 at 46.
2
0 Jenks, supra, note 5 at 523.
21 de Smith, supra, note 19 at 41.
22
Id. at 42.
23 Id. at 44.
24
1d.
25 Goldharv. The Queen, [19601 S.C.R. 431; 25 D.L.RL (2d) 401; 126 C.C.C. 337;
33 C.R. 71 per Cartwright, J. at 440-41 (S.C.R.); 408 (D.L.R.); 346 (C.C.C.); 80

(C.R.).
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Thirdly, the prerogative writs were awarded "pre-eminently out of the
Court of King's Bench". 26 Finally, at common law they would go to exempt
jurisdictions, such as the Counties Palatine,27 to which the King's writs did
not normally run.
(2) The Statutory Law of England
The first of the habeas corpus statutes was passed in 1640, entitled "an
Act for the regulating of the Privy Council, and for taking away the Court
commonly called the Star Chamber".2 This Act abolished the Star Chamber
and provided that if any person should be imprisoned by any court exercising
jurisdiction similar to that of the Star Chamber or by the command of the
King or Privy Council, he had the right upon demand or motion in open
court to the immediate issue of a writ of habeas corpus. The gaolor was to
bring his prisoner before the judges of the court from which the writ issued,
with a certificate of the true cause of his imprisonment. Within three days of
the return, the court had to determine the legality of the imprisonment and
29
deliver, bail, or remand the prisoner accordingly.
One of the defects in the writ of habeas corpus at common law was that
it could only be issued in term, and not in vacation. Thus the Act of 1679
(the most famous of all) was enacted "for the better securing the liberty of
the subject". 30 It was passed after much discussion in the House of Lords "and then only owing to a mistake in the counting of the votes, so the story
goes". 31 The act was procedural and concerned only with criminal matters.
By it any person detained in the vacation for any crime, except felony or
treason, could apply to the Lord Chancellor or any judge of the superior
courts. Prisoners indicted for treason or felony were to be tried at the next
sessions or bailed, unless the witnesses for the Crown were not ready, in
which case the prisoners could be committed until the following term. If not
tried then, they had to be discharged.t m As noted below, this Act is reproduced
in the Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1897 and has been held to be in force in
Ontario proceedings under federal criminal law.33
Holdsworth writes that the "success of the Act in effecting its object is
illustrated by the desire of James II to get it repealed." 3 4 However, it dealt
2

6de Smith, supra, note 19 at 45.

27

In the Act of 1679 s. 11 provides "'That an habeas corpus according to the true
intent and meaning of this act, may be directed and run into any county palatine, the
cinque-ports, or other privileged places within the kingdom of England ... any law or
usage to the contrary notwithstanding."
28
29

16 Car. 1, c. 10.
Id., s. 6.

30 31 Car. 1,c. 2 (emphasis added).
31

Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed. London: Butter-

worth & Co., 1956) at 58. See, too, Holdsworth, supra, note 7 at 117-18,
32

31 Car. II, c. 2, s. 7. This matter is examined more fully in Part E (4) of this

paper.

33

Re Johnston and Shane, [1959] O.R. 322; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 102; 124 C.C.C. 23
(CA.).
34

Holdsworth, supra, note 7 at 118.
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only with criminal cases. As for civil cases, the right to apply to the court
during term existed at common law3 5 - but terms were of short duration.
Although judges began to issue writs in vacation as well as in term in civil
cases, a person could get no relief against a judge who refused to do so. This
led to the Act of 1816, "for more effectually securing the liberty of the subject". 30 This act applied to persons deprived of liberty otherwise than by
reason of a charge of crime, unless they were imprisoned for debt or on
process in a civil suit. As examples, children unlawfully detained from their
parents or persons wrongfully held as lunatics were now entitled to the writ
in vacation time. Thus, like habeas corpus in criminal matters to 1679, habeas
corpus in civil matters was also merely jus non scriptum in England until
1816.37
(3) The Law in Ontario
Habeas corpus was not introduced into Canada by the Quebec Act of
1774.38 Only in 1784, by a proclamation of Haldimand, then GovernorGeneral, did habeas corpus in criminal matters become law in Canada. This
proclamation 0 practically reproduces the Act of 1679:40
Be it declared and enacted... that from... the day of the publication of this
Ordinance, all persons who shall be or stand committed or detained in any prison
within this Province, for any criminal or supposed criminal offence, shall of
right be entitled to demand... from the Court of King's Bench in this Province
. .. the writ of Habeas Corpus, together with all the benefit resulting therefrom
... as His Majesty's subjects within the realm of England.. . are there entitled
to that 41
writ, and the benefit arising therefrom by the common and statute laws
thereof.

This legislation was confirmed by The Constitutional Act, 179 1.

At the time of the separation of the old Province of Quebec into Upper
and Lower Canada in 1791, the common law of habeas corpus and the Act
of 1679, by virtue of the Ordinance of 1784, were already in force in what
became Upper Canada, so that no act of the Upper Canadian Legislature
was required to accomplish this. 45 The Act of 1679 is reprinted in R.S.O.
1897, 44 omitting ss. 10-14, not applicable to Canada. This Act, "perhaps
more correctly in the form of the Haldimand Ordinance", is in force in
85 Re Johnston and Shane, supra,note 33 at 328 (O.R.); 106 (D.L.R.); 28 (C.C.C.).
80 56 Geo. I, c. 100 (emphasis added).
37 Storgoff, supra, note 4 per Taschereau, J. at 570 (S.C.R.); 715 (D.L.R.); 48
(C.C.C.).
38 Brunet, supra, note 1 at 12-13.
c. 1.
89 24 Geo. m11,
4
o Storgoff, supra, note 4 at 569 (S.C.R.); 713 (D.L.R.); 46 (C.C.C.).
41 Id.
42 1791 (Imp.), c. 31. See Storgoff, supra, note 4 at 537 (S.C.R.); 683 (D.L.R.);
12 (C.C.C.) for an explanation.
43
Re Johnston and Shane, supra, note 33 at 327 (O.R.); 105 (D.L.R.); 27
(C.C.C.).
44 IS.O. 1897, vol. HI, p. xxxvi.
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Ontario; but "insofar as it relates to criminal matters within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Dominion45Parliament, it cannot be amended or repealed
by the Ontario Legislature".
As noted earlier, the Act of 1679 did not apply to civil matters, leading
to the Act of 1816 in England (and of 1812 in Lower Canada). 46 The Ontario Act of 186647 is based on the English Act of 1816 and was apparently
enacted for the same purpose, that is, to extend the provisions of the Act of
1679 to civil cases of restraint. The preambles of the two Acts (1816 and
1866) are almost identical. The English Act in s. 1 specifically excepts from
its operation persons restrained "for some criminal or supposed criminal
matter" (they already had the benefit of the Act of 1679). But the Act of
1866 in Canada contains no such exception. 48 Morden, l.A. thus held in
Johnston49 that the language of the Act of 1866 "is clear and unambiguous
and in its plain and ordinary meaning it covers habeas corpus in both its
criminal and civil aspects".50 Accordingly, the Act of 1866 "never
having been specifically repealed is by virtue of Section 129 of the B.N.A.
Act unquestionably still in force in this Province". 5 '
proAs well, the present Ontario Habeas Corpus Act5 deals with the
53
cedure in applications related to matters under provincial jurisdiction.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

C.

The leading case on legislative jurisdiction in habeas corpus is Storgoff."4
Storgoff was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by a police magistrate
for being nude in a public place, contrary to the Criminal Code. He succeeded
in a motion for discharge and release from custody made on the return to a
writ of habeas corpus. The Attorney-General of British Columbia appealed
to the British Columbia Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 6 of the Court of
Appeal Act.5 5 The appeal was allowed, the writ quashed, and Storgoff recom45

Re Johnston and Shane, supra, note 33 at 327 (O.R.); 105 (D.L.R.); 27

(C.c.c.).
46

Brunet, supra, note 1 at 12 and 13.

47 29-30 Vict., c. 45. This Act is conveniently reproduced in E.P. Hartt, Habeas

Corpus and Certiorariin CriminalMatters in [1961] Special Lectures of the Law Society
of Upper Canada, Remedies (Toronto: DeBoo Ltd., 1961) at 313.
48 ld., s. 1. ("When any person shall be confined or restrained of his or her liberty
...within Upper Canada.. .".) The Act applies only to Upper Canada because Lower
Canada had the benefit of the Act of 1812 in civil matters, predating even the English
Act of 1816. See Storgoff, supra, note 4 at 569-70 (S.C.R.); 714-15 (D.L.R.); 46-48

(C.c.c.).
49

Re Johnston and Shane, supra, note 33.

50 d. at 329 (O.R.); 107-08 (D.L.R.); 30 (C.C.C.).
51

Hartt, supra, note 47 at 315.
R.S.O. 1970, c. 197.
53
This will be examined infra, Part H (2).
54
Storgoff, supra, note 4. This case is commented upon by D.M. Gordon in (1945),
23 C.B.R. 595.
5

2

55

R.S.B.C. 1936, c. 57.
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mitted to custody. To test his renewed detention, a second application was
made under s. 57 of the Supreme Court Act,5 6 by which every judge of the
Supreme Court of Canada had concurrent jurisdiction with the judges of the
provincial superior courts to issue the writ in criminal matters. At the time
there was no federal legislation authorizing an appeal from an order discharging a prisoner on the return of a writ of habeas corpus, nor was there
any such right at common law. 57
The argument for federal competence was based on s. 91(27) of the
British North America Act 58 - "Procedure in Criminal Matters"; the province stressed s. 92(13) - "Property and Civil Rights" - and s. 92(14) "Administration of Justice in the Province... including Procedure in Civil
Matters". Habeas corpus having always been regarded as a great bulwark of
"civil" liberty, the issue arose as to whether this writ would invoke exclusive
provincial competence under its "civil" procedure power.
The court held that with respect to any right of appeal from a decision
on the writ arising out of a conviction under federal criminal law, legislative
jurisdiction lay exclusively with Parliament. Several judgments were rendered,
leaving the precise basis of the decision somewhat uncertain. Kerwin, J. agreed
that the writ was indeed designed to enforce a right to personal liberty,
but that right may have been infringed by process in criminal or civil proceedings
and that distinction serves to indicate the dividing line between the power of
Parliament and the British Columbia Legislature to legislate with reference to
the writ.5 9

Here the application to the Supreme Court of British Columbia was a step
in the criminal proceedings which resulted in Storgoff's imprisonment and
was thus a matter of criminal law or procedure as to which the British
Columbia Legislature had no power to legislate.
Taschereau, J. noted that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 in its recital
made it clear that only in "criminal or supposed" criminal matters was the
Act to apply. The Act of 1816 referred to non-criminal matters, indicating
a distinction between habeas corpus in civil and in criminal proceedings. As
did the other members of the majority in the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Taschereau adopted the reasoning of the House of Lords in Amand: 60
It is the nature and character of the proceeding in which habeas corpus is sought
which provide the test. If the matter is one the direct outcome of which may be
trial of the applicant and his possible punishment for an alleged offence by a
court claiming jurisdiction to do so, the matter is criminal. 61
56

R.S.C. 1970, c. S-19. This provision has now been repealed by R.S.C. 1970
(Ist Supp.), c. 44, s. 4.
57 Storgofl, supra, note 4 at 562 (S.C.R.); 707 (D.L.R.); 39 (C.C.C.).
58 (1867), 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
GOStorgoff, supra, note 4 at 559-60 (S.C.R.); 705 (D.L.R.); 37 (C.C.C.).
00
Amand v. Home Secretary, [1943] A.C. 147.
61 ld. at 156, per Viscount Simon.
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It is not necessary that proceedings end in a criminal trial or punishment,
so long as they put the person brought up before the magistrate "in jeopardy
of a criminal charge".6
Rand, J. concluded that it would be incompatible for Parliament to
have jurisdiction over criminal law on the one hand and the provinces to
have independent jurisdiction over habeas corpus on the other. That would
permit the provinces to abolish the writ or so drastically enlarge its scope as
to encroach on the substantive criminal law.0 3
Laskin has written that some of the discussion in Storgoff would exclude
provincial competence in respect of habeas corpus (although there be no
federal legislation) if the matter out of which the writ arose was itself within
federal authority. He submits this is "too broad a proposition as applied to
non-criminal matters". 64 But is it really "too broad"? Rand, J. was concerned
about the incompatibility of, on the one hand, federal substantive competence
and, on the other, provincial procedural authority which might impair the
effectiveness of the substantive federal law. If this reasoning is sound, perhaps
it is appropriate to distribute habeas corpus jurisdiction on the basis of the
head of legislative jurisdiction from which the proceedings in question arose.
In Wattebled65 the issue was whether habeas corpus in extradition proceedings constituted a civil matter, governed by the Quebec Code of Civil
Procedure, or a criminal matter. The Quebec Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal
Side, concluded that detention under a writ of extradition remains criminal
since it arises out of a criminal affair. 66 Immigration, on the other hand, is a
civil matter. 67 Therefore, according to Kerwin, J. in Storgoff, it is for the
provincial legislatures to regulate the use of the writ. They would also have a
constitutional foundation for so doing in s. 95 of the B.N.A. Act, which
makes immigration a concurrent power. However, the fact of concurrency
means provincial legislation would have to yield to pre-emptive federal
enactment.
Of course, where a matter involving habeas corpus arises under a head
of s. 92 (for example, child custody, mental health, or provincial summary
offences), it is for the province to68provide for the procedure, including rights
of appeal in the provincial courts.
62

Storgoff, supra, note 4 at 574 (S.C.R.); 719 (D.L.R.); 52 (C.C.C.).
Id. at 584 (S.C.R.); 727 (D.L.P.); 61-62 (C.C.C.).
64 B. Laskin, CanadianConstitutionalLaw, ed. A. Abel (4th ed. Toronto: Carswell,
1973) at 813.
05
Re Wattebled, [1953] (Quo.) B.R. 108; 106 C.C.C. 200; 16 C.R. 301.
66
1d. at 118 (B.R.); 201 (C.C.C.); 304 (C.R.). Hence the civil appeal provisions
could not be invoked.
67
Masella v. Langlais, [1955] S.C.R. 263; [1955] 4 D.L.R. 346; 112 C.C.C. 1 at
272-73 (S.C.R.); 354 (D.L.R.); 10 (C.C.C.).
68 R. v. McIllree, [1950] 1 W.W.R. 894; 97 C.C.C. 89; 9 C.R. 447.
63
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HABEAS CORPUS AD SUBJICIENDUM:
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is that "great and efficacious
writ, in all manner of illegal confinement."09 It is available in both criminal
and civil cases, although it cannot be obtained by an alien enemy or a
prisoner of war. 70 It was used to release a negro slave from confinement in a
ship on the Thames, on the ground that an allegation of slavery was not a
sufficient return. 71 Habeas corpus has freed members of the armed forces
detained in military barracks for charges under military law.72 Its use in the
child custody cases is examined later in this paper. 73 But our focus will be
on the criminal process, where the writ has had its greatest impact.
(1) Courts of Record and the Prerogative Nature of the Writ
Superior Courts
As explained earlier, the writ is a prerogative writ. Such writs do not
issue to attack the process of a superior court. The present Ontario Habeas
Corpus Act statutorily excludes from its purview persons "imprisoned... by
the judgment, conviction or order of the Supreme Court. . .,.4 The Act of
1866 also excludes persons "imprisoned by the judgment ... of any Court
of Record, Court of Oyer and Terminer or General Gaol Delivery, or Court
of General Quarter Sessions of the Peace".7 5
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court of Canada in Sproule" made it
clear that habeas corpus would not issue to question a superior court's order.
The accused was convicted and sentenced on a charge of murder by a court
of oyer and terminer in British Columbia; this was affirmed on a writ of
error by the Supreme Court of that province. Sproule managed to obtain a
writ of habeas corpus from a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Chambers, and the decision to issue the writ was appealed to the full court.
Ritchie, C.J. found the Supreme Court of British Columbia to be a "superior
criminal court.., of the highest character". 77 To such courts belongs "the
right to supervise inferior courts, and entertain writs of error from the courts
of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery". 78 He held that the judge in
Chambers should not have issued the writ, given that there was a conviction
60 Blackstone, supra, note 2 at 131.
70 R. v. Supt. of Vine Street Police Station, ex parte Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. 268;

R. v. Bottrill, ex p. Kuechenmeister, [1947] K.B. 41; Re Sullivan, [1941] O.R. 417;
[1942] 2 D.L.R. 799; 78 C.C.C. 400 (C.A.). See, also, the War Measures Act, R.S.C.

1970,71c. W-2, s. 5.

Somnersett's Case, 20 S. T. 1, as noted in Plucknett, supra, note 31 at 58.
Re Thompson (1945), 1 C.R. 60 (Ont. H.C.). Annotation by A.E. Popple at 73.
73
See text, infra, Part G(5).
74 R.S.O. 1970, c. 197, s. 1(1).
75
s. 1.
70 In Re Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140.
77 Id.at 186.
78 Id. at 187.
72
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and sentence by a criminal court of competent jurisdiction, with the record
of the Superior Court in error affirming and sustaining such conviction and
sentence and the affidavit of the sheriff showing the prisoner was held in
custody under and by virtue of this conviction and sentence.79 Furthermore,
if the record of a superior court contains the recital of facts requisite to confer
jurisdiction, it is conclusive and cannot be contradicted by extrinsic evidence;
the record is of "unerring verity, and the law will not, in such a case, allow
the record to be contradicted". 80 Superior courts, then, are presumed to have
jurisdiction: but the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta does not

apply to inferior tribunals, where the burden of proving the court has jurisdiction is cast upon the party so alleging. 8'
A sentence passed by a superior court founds the right to detain and
is "conclusive as to the prisoner being a convicted felon".82 The proper
remedy is appeal or writ of error. Were the rule otherwise, the officer in
whose custody the prisoner is would be put in what Ritchie, C.J. calls:
this most anomalous and trying position, compelling him to elect to hold the
prisoner under the judgment and sentence of a court of unquestionably competent
criminal jurisdiction, confirmed by the unanimous decision of the full bench of
the Supreme Court of the province... or to discharge him under the order of
a single judge at chambers ....83

In sum, the court held that as soon as it appears by the record of a superior

court of criminal jurisdiction that the prisoner has been tried and convicted
jurisdiction of a judge to issue
of a felony and sentenced by such a court,8 the
4
the writ or discharge the prisoner ceases.
County Courts
The Act of 1866 excludes from its scope the "judgment, conviction or
decree of any Court of Record... or Court of General Quarter Sessions of
the Peace".8 5 Similarly the present Ontario Act excludes "the judgment,
conviction or order of the.., court of general sessions of the peace or other
court of record". 86 Thus it seems clear that habeas corpus will not lie to
challenge the proceedings of the general sessions of the peace. Furthermore,
in Martin87 Middleton, J.A. held that the County Court Judges' Criminal
id. at 190.
80 ld. at 191.
81
R. v. O'Blenis, [1965] 2 C.C.C. 165 (N.B.C.A.). See, also, A. Rubinstein,
Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965)
at 109-12.
8S Sproule, supra, note 76 at 199.
79

83

Id.

84 Id. at 200. It has been suggested that the Sproule rule was in effect violated in
Storgoff by the Supreme Court of Canada: see Gordon, supra, note 54.
85 S. 1. In Ontario the general sessions of the peace have much the same role as
quarter sessions in England: D.M. Gordon, Challenging Convictions by Habeas Corpus
and Certiorari (1959-60), 2 Crim. L.Q. 296 at 302. See, also, the definition of "court of
criminal jurisdiction" in s. 2 of the Criminal Code.
88
R.S.O. 1970, c. 197, s. 1.
87R. v. Martin (1927), 60 O.L.R. 577 (Chambers).
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Court was a court of record within the meaning of the Act of 1866 and, as a
result, habeas corpus was not available to question the sentence that had
been imposed. Gale, J. (as he then was) reached the same conclusion in
Lunan88 wherein a County Court judge committed the accused for contempt.
In dismissing the application for a writ of habeas corpus, Gale, J. found he
had "no right in these proceedings to review what was done by the judge of
the County Court Judges' Criminal Court".89
Similarly, in a civil use of the writ, an application was made for the
discharge of a prisoner on the return to a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner
having been arrested under The FraudulentDebtors Arrest Act90 pursuant
to an order by a County Court judge.91 Barlow, J. referred to the Ontario
Habeas Corpus Act, which excluded from its scope an order for detention
"by process in any action" of any "court of record". 9 2 His Lordship held
the County Court to be a court of record and accordingly quashed the writ
of habeas corpus.
It seems clear from Martin that habeas corpus will not issue where the
applicant has been convicted on indictment by a County Court. However,
D.M. Gordon points out that one should distinguish between the case where
a County Court judge is trying an indictment from the case where he is
hearing an appeal from summary conviction. "Though in England certiorari
or habeas corpus will not lie to question sessions' convictions on indictment,
either writ will lie to question their appellate decisions".9 3 As indicated above,
the Ontario legislation bars an application where a "court of record" is involved. Gordon concedes that when County Courts sit on appeals in summary matters, they are "no less courts of record than when trying indictments".9 4 He admits that, taken literally, the statutory language equally bars
the writ for questioning a County Court judgment on appeal from a summary
conviction, but he doubts this was the intent, given the distinction followed
in England. In actual fact, habeas corpus has been held to lie where a County
Court judge, sitting in appeal from a summary conviction, exceeds his
jurisdiction. 95
Provincial Courts
Section 14 of The Provincial Courts Act90 states that there shall be

established in every county and district "a court of record" to be called the
88

Ex parte Lunan, [1951] O.R. 257 (H.C.).

8

9 Id. at 258. See, too, Ex parteSternig (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 292 (H.C.).
0 R.S.O. 1937, c. 128.
0
1 Re Schmidt, [1945] O.W.N. 504 (H.C.).
02
R.S.O. 1937, c. 129, s. 1(1).
03 Gordon, supra, note 85 at 304-05.
94

1d.

95 R. v. Petit, [1932] 1 W.W.R. 161; 57 C.C.C. 216 (Man. K.B.); R. v. Stone,
[1941] 2 W.W.R. 63; [1941] 4 D.L.R. 427; 76 C.C.C. 288 (B.C.S.C.).
90 R.S.O. 1970, c. 369.
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"Provincial Court (Criminal Division)". In Hill97 the accused applied for a
writ of habeas corpus after he had been committed for trial following a preliminary inquiry by a Provincial Court judge. The Crown claimed the application should be summarily dismissed, since the Provincial Court is a "court of
record" and since s. 1 of the Act of 1866 provides that habeas corpus does
not lie for an order of any "court of record". Pennell, J. found that the
expression "court of record" has been used in more than one sense. The
superior courts of the common law used to bear this name, and in closely
examining the wording of s. 1, he held that "court of record" was there used
in the restricted sense, meaning the superior courts, and not in a general
sense to cover all superior and inferior "courts of record". Since a Court of
Oyer and Terminer or General Gaol Delivery or General Quarter Sessions
of the Peace has power to fine or imprison and would, therefore, come
within the general definition of a court of record urged by the Crown, it
would not have been necessary to enumerate these other courts unless "court
of record" was used in the narrow sense. 98 Pennell, J. noted that since there
is no appeal from a committal for trial, to exclude habeas corpus would leave
the subject without a remedy. Thus he found that the language of s. 1 of the
Act of 1866 did not reveal an intention "to abrogate a procedure to immediately determine the right to freedom by an applicant committed for trial
upon no or insufficient evidence". 99 In conclusion, an application for habeas
corpus is not excluded by virtue of the fact that Provincial Courts are now
called "courts of record".
(2) The Requirement of Close Custody

In view of the opening words of the Act of 1866 ("When any person
shall be confined or restrained of his or her liberty.. ."), may a person out
on bail seek habeas corpus? In Isbell'0 0 the applicant moved before Rinfret,
J. in Chambers, seeking to quash the information and other proceedings by
habeas corpus. The writ was refused because the accused was on bail:
[uln order to make a case for habeas corpus in criminal matters there must
be an actual confinement or, at least, the present means of enforcing it. A person
may apply while in the custody of a constable, immediately upon being arrested,
and need not wait until he is actually incarcerated. But a person at large on
bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to entitle him to the writ.' 0 '
...

His Lordship was fortified in his conclusion by the fact that bail is one of the
alternative remedies that may be granted upon habeas corpus. 0 2
The bail issue arose before the Supreme Court in the leading case of
9
7Ex parte Hill, [1970] 1 O.R. 699; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 321; [1970] 2 C.C.C. 264; 8
C.R.N.S. 124 (H.C.).
98
1d. at 705 (O.R.); 327 (D.L.R.); 270 (C.C.C.); 131 (C.R.N.S.).
99
1d. at 707 (O.R.); 329 (D.L.R.); 271 (C.C.C.); 133 (C.R.N.S.). Hill was followed in Ex parte Wortsman, [1971] 1 O.R 136 (ILC.).
100 Re Isbell, [1930] S.C.R. 62; [1930] 1 D.L.R. 393; 52 C.C.C. 170.
01
Id. at 65 (S.C.R.); 395-96 (D.L.R.); 173 (C.C.C.).
102 The orders available are discussed infra, Part F (1).
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03
Masella v. Langlais.1
Masella had been ordered to be detained and deported
by a Board of Inquiry under the Immigration Act. 04 He gave written notice
of his intention to appeal to the Minister and was released on the same date
from custody, having deposited a sum of $500 and signed a written undertaking to report weekly to an immigration inspector. While thus at liberty,
Masella asked that a writ of habeas corpus issue, addressed to the immigra-

tion officer, "enjoining him to bring the petitioner . . . before one of the

Judges of this tribunal without delay". 10 5 Neither at the time of the filing of
the petition nor at the time of its issue or presentment was Masella detained
by the officer.

Locke, J. quoted from Barnardo v. Ford,0 6 where Lord Watson stated
that "it is the fact of detention, and nothing else, which gives the Court its
jurisdiction". Mr. Justice Locke noted that the actual Canadian practice for
a person freed on bail who wishes to test the jurisdiction of the court which
ordered his original detention is to surrender himself into custody and make
the application when thus under restraint.10 7 E.G. Hachbom explains the
proper procedure that should be followed where an accused out on bail wishes
to surrender himself into custody in order to challenge the validity of a committal for trial.' 08 Apparently a practice had arisen whereby the applicant
would simply wander into jail at the time of the application, though no
proper warrant of committal had been issued and executed. The proper procedure is for the accused to relieve himself of his obligation under the
recognizance and obtain an order in writing for his committal, so that the
Governor of the jail will be justified in receiving him. If the application is
dismissed, a fresh order granting bail to the accused should be obtained
before his release. Otherwise he must stay in custody until some other order
is made. If the application for a writ is allowed, then upon presentation of a
proper order from the Supreme Court of Ontario he may be released. The
possibility that, having surrendered himself into custody, an applicant will
fail to regain his release on bail constitutes the "downside risk" inherent in
this practice. 0 9 The whole matter of surrendering oneself into custody pending a habeas corpus application is now further complicated by the Bail Reform
Act" 0 if the accused has been released on an appearance notice, undertaking,
or promise to appear."'
3
1O

Masella, supra, note 67. For a case comment see J.W. Dunton (1956), 34
C.B.R. 1073.
104 R.S.C. 1927, c. 93.
1
OMasella, supra, note 67 at 269 (S.C.R.); 351 (D.L.R.); 6 (C.C.C.).

100 [1892] A.C. 326 at 334.
107

Masella, supra, note 67 at 271 (S.C.R.); 353 (D.L.R.); 8 (C.C.C.).
108 E.G. Hachborn, Review of Committal for Trial: Procedure (1968-69), 11 Crim.

L.Q. 138.
109 See, also, Ex parte McGinnis, [1971] 3 O.R. 783; 4 C.C.C. (2d) 262 (H.C.)
at 788 (O.R.); 267 (C.C.C.).
110 R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 2.
111 R.E. Saihany, Canadian Criminal Procedure (2d ed. Agincourt: Canada Law

Book Ltd., 1972) at 92 n. 12.
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In Masella"2 the Supreme Court overruled two previous cases which
had taken a somewhat wider view of the availability of the writ where a
person was not under actual restraint. In Cameron 1 3 a physician who was on
bail obtained the writ, the court reasoning that "bail is custody and he is
constructively in gaol." A condition of the granting of bail was that Cameron
should appear at the November term of the Court and not depart from its
jurisdiction. In reviewing the case, Locke, J. felt that "no such restriction
entitled Cameron to the remedy of habeas corpus when.., he was at liberty
on bail." 114 So, too, in De Bernonville's case"15 the applicant was on bail
requiring him to report monthly to the immigration office. Mr. Justice Locke
was of the view that if the writ were issued on the ground that there was a
deportation order outstanding under which the applicant might be taken into
custody, "any accused person for whose arrest a warrant has been issued but
which has 6not been executed might apply by habeas corpus for his
discharge"."1
Accordingly, before a person may apply for a writ of habeas corpus,
he must be in close custody. To hold otherwise would be a contradiction in
terms, for the writ is designed to inquire into the validity of detention. If
there is no detention, there is nothing into which one can inquire. The mere
possibility of re-arrest or the fact that one's liberty is partially restrained by
bail conditions will not suffice.
E.

AVAILABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS

(1) After Arrest
We turn now to a detailed examination of the various stages at which
a person may apply for a writ of habeas corpus in the criminal process. The
first of these is after arrest, as in Re Gigliotti,"1 7 where the applicant sought
discharge because of alleged irregularity in his original arrest on a charge of
vagrancy. He was also subject to arrest on an extradition warrant. Middleton,
J.A. dismissed the motion, holding that in detention under criminal process
the right to habeas corpus and to discharge does not depend on the legality or
illegality of the original caption, but upon the legality or illegality of the
present detention. Where the warrant of commitment is sufficient to justify
the prisoner's detention," 8 the court will not inquire into any irregularity in

112

Masella, supra, note 67.

113R. v. Cameron (1897), 1 C.C.C. 169 (Que. Q.B.).

"34 Masella, supra, note 67 at 276 (S.C.R.); 357 (D.L.R.); 13 (C.C.C.).
115
De Bernonville v. Langlais, [1951] Que. C.S. 277.
116 Masella, supra, note 67 at 274 (S.C.R.); 356 (D.L.R.); 11 (C.C.C.).
117 [1936] O.W.N. 32 (H.C.).
"'s But if a warrant is a nullity, then the applicant may be discharged: Ex parte
Peters, [1973] 1 W.W.R. 568; 10 C.C.C. (2d) 221; 21 C.R.N.S. 91 (B.C.S.C.), where a
bench warrant was issued without regard to the requirements of s. 456.1 of the Criminal
Code. The case was affirmed on appeal: 24 C.R.N.S. 214.
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his caption. In Gigliotti the extradition warrant provided sufficient justification for detention apart from any irregularity in the vagrancy arrest. 119
Similarly, in Haagstrom'20 the accused in habeas corpus proceedings
claimed there was nothing before the court to show the authority for his
arrest. No warrant had been produced to him at the time of arrest, although
a warrant was said to be outstanding against him. Coady, J. in the British
Columbia Supreme Court held:
,. . on the authorities it seems clear that the accused is not entitled to be dis-

charged on habeas corpus in respect of the irregularity of his arrest if the
original warrant in due form and duly endorsed is returned in answer to the
writ. So long as121
valid cause of detention is shown on the return of the writ,
that is sufficient.

The question to be determined, then, is whether the prisoner is unlawfully
detained, not whether he was unlawfully arrested. 1'
(2) After Bail Refused
At common law, the proper remedy to obtain bail when it was refused was
by way of habeas corpus. 3 Indeed, s. 3 of the Act of 1866 makes bail one
of the orders available. Thus prior to express provision being made in the
1955 Criminal Code,'2 4 the only way bail could be reviewed was by habeas
corpus. The new legislation provided an appeal, as well as the provision that
no application could be made by way of habeas corpus to review bail. 2 5
In Quiney120 Milvain, J. in the Alberta Supreme Court, relying on historical concern for the liberty of the subject, felt that the 1955 amendment
merely provided a procedure which took the place of the common law
remedy, but did not "destroy any fundamental rights enjoyed under common
law principles. It would take express words to do so".2 7 With all respect, it

would be difficult to be more express than to say, "No application shall be
made by way of habeas corpus for the purpose of fixing, reviewing or varying
bail". In Smith 2 8 the accused applied for a writ of habeas corpus to review
orders refusing bail. Spence, J. (as he then was) in the Ontario High Court

110 Middleton, J.A. went on to indicate there is a difference if a prisoner is detained

on a civil process, in which case the illegality or irregularity of his original caption
would afford ground for his discharge - but not in a criminal case.
12 0R. v. Haagstrom, [1943] 2 W.W.R. 442; [1943] 1 D.L.R. 236; 78 C.C.C. 332

(B.C.S.C.).
121 Id. at 442 (W.W.R.); 237 (D.L.R.); 333-34 (C.C.C.).
122 See, too, Ex parte Fong Goey Jow, [1948] S.C.R. 37; [1948] 1 D.L.R. 817; 90
C.C.C. 289; 4 C.R. 439 at 42 (S.C.R.); 821 (D.L.R.); 294 (C.C.C.); 444 (C.R.).
123 Salhany, supra, note 111 at 58. Also, 4 Co. Inst. 70-71.
124 Enacted by S. C. 1953-54, c. 51; in force April 1, 1955 by S. C. 1955, c. 2, s. 1.
125 S. 465(2).
120R. v. Quiney (1966), 50 C. R. 201 (Alta. S.C.). See Annotation by M.H. Harris
at 204.
127 Id. at 204.
128 R. v. Smith

(1960), 128 C.C.C. 407 (Ont. H.C.).
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went the opposite route from Milvain, J. and found the application was prohibited by the old s. 465(2).
Under the new bail reform legislation, the order of a justice relating to
bail may be reviewed by a county or superior court judge on two days'
notice. 29 The decision of the judge may be reviewed by the same or another
judge, but only after the expiration of thirty days from the date of the decision of the last judge, unless leave is obtained. 130 If an accused is in custody
pending trial on an indictable offence, the person having custody is required
to apply to a judge to fix a date for hearing upon the expiration of ninety
days (thirty days for summary offences) from his original bail hearing before
a justice. 131 The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether or not the
accused should be released, and the judge may consider unreasonable delay
on the part of the Crown in deciding whether or not the accused should be
freed.132 Having established this regime of review, s. 459.1 states:
No application may be made by way of habeas corpus for the purpose of obtaining the making of any order under this Part ... relating to interim release
or for the purpose of reviewing or varying any decision made thereunder relating
to interim release or detention.

Section 2(c) (iii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights

133

reads:

Every law of Canada shall... be so construed and applied as not to... deprive
a person who has been arrested or detained of the remedy by way of habeas
corpus for the determination of the validity of his detention and for his release
if the detention is not lawful.

Is s. 459.1 inoperative by virtue of s. 2(c) (iii)?
On the one hand Parliament has established elaborate procedures to
review the matter of detention. These are not, however, as generous as they
could be. One must wait thirty days before challenging the refusal of a judge
to grant bail. 134 Where the trial is delayed, s. 459 means a person may be in
jail for ninety days (for indictable offences) before his detention is subject
to review. In determining the content to give the rights enumerated in tim
Canadian Bill of Rights, Ritchie, J. has stated:
... the meaning to be given to the language employed in the Bill of Rights
is the meaning which it bore in Canada at the time when the Bill was enacted,
and it follows that the phrase "equality before the law" is to be construed in
light of the law existing in Canada at that time. 135

If the right to use habeas corpus to obtain bail is to be construed "in light
of the law existing in Canada at that time", one is faced with the privative
129 Criminal Code, s. 457.5. The procedure for interim release and review differs
for more serious offences, such as murder. See s. 457.7 and s. 608.1.
la0 S. 457.6(9).

459(1) (a)(i).
S. 459(3).

131S.
132

133 S.C. 1960, c. 44; R.S.C. 1970, Appendix

m.

134 S. 457.6 (9).
135A.-G. Can. v. Lavell (1973), 38 D.LR. (3d) 481 at 494 (S.C.C.).
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provisions of the old s. 465(2) , s6 which are substantially the same as those
of the present s. 459.1. However, s. 5(2) of the Bill of Rights provides that
existing Acts of Parliament are subject to the Bill, which of course would
include s. 465(2). One might therefore boldly attempt to argue along the
lines proposed by Milvain, J. in Quiney that habeas corpus survives as a
remedy to review bail. 8 7 However, given the Supreme Court's reluctance to
sustain arguments based on the Bill of Rights, such a course would appear
to be futile.'0 8
(3) After Committal for Trial Following Preliminary Inquiry

Under s. 475(1) of the Criminal Code, after the evidence has been
taken by a justice conducting a preliminary inquiry he may "commit the
accused for trial" if "in his opinion the evidence is sufficient!'. There is no
provision for appealing this determination. Therefore the common way to
seek review of the "committal" is by prerogative writ. Where the accused
is in custody, he may resort to habeas corpus; otherwise, only certiorari
remains. But historically certiorari was available solely where the ruling to be
reviewed could be characterized as judicial and not ministerial or administrative in nature." 9 The test to be applied is "whether it concludes a question
of legal right or liability ... a mere interlocutory ruling cannot be quashed,
but only a final disposition".1 40 D.M. Gordon, in a comprehensive examination of the preliminary inquiry, concludes that such a hearing is not amenable
to attack by certiorari, as there is no record of adjudication to quash. A
justice does not deliver any "judgment"; he does not decide the guilt or
innocence of the accused; and the committal is made entirely within his
discretion.
In Irwin'41 a motion by way of certiorari was made to quash a warrant
of committal for trial after a preliminary hearing. Barlow, J. in the Ontario
High Court relied on the leading English authority, Roscommon, 142 in holding that certiorari would not lie to quash a warrant of committal by a
130 See text, supra, p. 164.
137 Id.
18
The Bill of Rights argument was raised in Sternig (supra, note 89), but Hughes,
J. rested his decision on other grounds. Review of bail in provincial summary offences
would continue to be by habeas corpus as the Summary Convictions Act, R.S.O. 1970,
c. 450, does not provide an appeal mechanism (see ss. 17-18), unless the tortuous argument is accepted that by virtue of s. 3 (which adopts, mutatis mutandis, Part XXIV of
the Criminal Code), the Code provisions relating to bail are adopted through s. 728(1).
'3 9 S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3d ed. London:
Stevens & Son, 1973) at 346-48.
40
2 D.M. Gordon, Quashing Committals for Trial (1959), 2 C.BJ. 67 at 70. The
review of committals for trial is also examined by Salhany, supra, note 111 at 90-93,
294-304; B.M. Haines, Committals and Certiorari (1965-66), 8 Crim. L. Q. 141; R.E.

Salhany, Review of Committal for Trial (1965-66), 8 Crim. L. Q. 31.
1

1

41

R. v. Irwin, [1944] 1 D.L.R. 618; [1943] O.W.N. 668; 80 C.C.C. 314 (H.C.).

42

R. v. Justices of Roscommon, [1894] 2 Ir. R. 158.
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Magistrate. In a similar application in Popoff143 Ruttan, I. in the British
Columbia Supreme Court felt that to invoke certiorari at this stage would
change the function of the superior court from a supervisory to an appellate
jurisdiction. However he concluded the writ was still available to supervise
the issue of the initial jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. Andrews, J. in
Guay144 has now gone further and found that in British Columbia certiorari
is available to quash a committal for trial on the ground there was no evi45 lIsley, C.J.
dence on which the committal could be made. But in Matheson&
in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that certiorari "at least when it is not
to remove a decision of a
certiorari in aid of habeas corpus does not1 lie
40
Magistrate to commit a defendant for trial".
In Botting147 the Ontario Court of Appeal followed Popoff. Evans, J.A.
(with Porter, C.J.O. concurring) concluded that if the grounds relate to the
"jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal then certiorari will lie but not otherwise".1 48 A reviewing and weighing of the evidence is outside the scope of
that writ. With all respect, His Lordship seems to have ignored the preliminary issue of whether the committal for trial is that kind of a ruling
which is subject to review by certiorari and plunged directly into the scope
of review that is available, having assumed that certiorari would lie.
On the other hand, Laskin, J.A. (as he then was) embarked on an
extensive analysis of whether certiorari was appropriate. Because a committal for trial adversely affects the accused, he felt it "technical in the extreme" to have broad review by habeas corpus with certiorari in aid when
a man is in custody following committal for trial, but to deny "even the
barest resort to certiorari alone simply because he has been released on
bail". 149 Perhaps the fact of detention is what justifies greater recourse to the
prerogative writs, as a man in jail is much more acutely affected by the
committal than one free on bail.
That certiorari is available now seems indisputable since the Supreme
Court of Canada's ruling in Patterson,150 wherein the Court held that "if
it is sought to review a committal for trial, there is only one ground for
143

1

44

Re Popoff (1959), 28 W.W.R. 317; 124 C.C.C. 115; 30 C.R. 354 (B.C.S.C.).
R. v. Guay (1973), 23 C.R.N.S. 116 (B.C.S.C.).

145 R. v. Matheson (1959), 123 C.C.C. 60 (N.S.S.C.).
146 Id. at 64. This is no longer good law: see infra, note 151.
147 R. v. Botting, [1966] 2 O.R. 121; 56 D.L.R. (2d) 25; 48 C.R. 73; [1966] 3
C.C.C. 373 (CA.).
148Id. at 124 (O.R.); 28 (D.L.R.); 75 (C.R.); 377 (C.C.C.). But in R. v. Dick,
[1968] 2 O.R. 351; [1969] 1 C.C.C. 147; 4 C.R.N.S. 102 (H.C.) Lieff, J. stated that

review of error of law on the face of the record was not precluded by Botting.
149 Botting, supra, note 147 at 132-33 (O.R.); 36-37 (D.L.R.); 83-84 (C.R.); 385

(C.C.C.).
150 Patterson v. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 409; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 398; 2 C.C.C. (2d)
227; 10 C.R.N.S. 55. This case is commented upon by B. Haines (1970), 10 C.R.N.S.
69 and M.E. Shannon, Q.C. (1970), 9 Alta. L.R. 141.
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action by the reviewing Court and that is lack of jurisdiction". 151 Judson, I.
appeared to assume, without question, that certiorari would lie but only where
lack of jurisdiction could be shown.
In Ontario by virtue of s. 5 of the Act of 1866, in "all" cases where a
writ of habeas corpus is issued, "it shall be lawful for the judge" to direct the
issue of a writ of certiorari out of the court. Therefore if the accused is in
custody, the standard procedure in Ontario to review a committal for trial is
an application for a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid. In other
provinces where there is no express statutory certiorari in aid in criminal
cases, "the judge possesses no such power, although there appears to be no
reason why the applicant cannot seek the issuance of both writs at the same
time". 1' 2 It is somewhat unfair, though, for Ontario to have this legislative
advantage. It would be desirable for Parliament to enact a uniform Habeas
Corpus Act to ensure equality before the law throughout Canada. An accused
person's rights of relief in the courts should not vary as he moves across
provincial boundaries.
The grounds on which habeas corpus may be sought were stated by
53
Judson, J.in Shumiatcher.1
It is important to note that the case arose in
Saskatchewan, so that certiorari in aid was not involved. His Lordship held
that the jurisdiction of the court in an inquiry into a committal for trial is
the same as for a warrant of committal after conviction. Specifically, inquiry
may be made into (1) the validity of the detaining process upon its face;
(2) the jurisdiction of the court by which process the subject is held in
custody. In the absence of power to issue a writ of certiorari in aid, a judge
may not look at the evidence at the preliminary hearing.154
Under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the court had no power to
examine into the truth of any return made by a gaolor.15 5 Thus when the
Act of 1816 (pertaining to civil matters) was passed, it provided that the
judge was entitled to inquire into the truth of a return to the writ.156 The
Ontario Act of 1866 (based on the Act of 1816) likewise permits the court
to "proceed to examine into the truth of the facts set forth in such return,
by affidavit or by affirmation". 157 Accordingly Judson, J.'s remarks as to the
first ground of inquiry on habeas corpus must be qualified in Ontario by the
provisions of the Act of 1866.
As for the second ground of attack on habeas corpus, namely the jurisdic1511d, at 411 (S.C.R.); 400 (D.L.R.); 229 (C.C.C.); 57 (C.R.N.S.). Patterson
was applied by Dubinsky, J. in Re Amero and The Queen (1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 313
(N.S.S.C.) wherein certiorari was held to be available if a magistrate has lost

jurisdiction.
152 Salhany, supra, note 111 at 292. But see Armah, infra, note 170.
15lin re Shuniatcher, [1962] S.C.R. 38; 131 C.C.C. 259; 36 C.R. 171.
104 Id. at 47 (S.C.R.); 267 (C.C.C.); 180 (C.R.). But see Armah, infra, note 170.
155 Holdsworth, supra, note 7 at 119-20.
156 Id.at 122. See ss. 3-4.
157 Ss. 3-4.
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tional one, any analysis must begin with the leading case of Nat Bell.158
There, after conviction for a provincial liquor offence, the accused moved
by way of certiorari to quash the order of a magistrate. To properly appreciate the scope of review on habeas corpus, it is helpful to consider Lord
Sumner's analysis of defects going to jurisdiction. The scope of review on
certiorari goes to two points: "one is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the
qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of
the law in the course of its exercise". 159 Review on the former is broad, and
affidavit evidence may be adduced to prove lack of jurisdiction. But in considering the course of the exercise (and specifically, reviewing the evidence),

"the question can at most be whether any evidence at all was given on the
essential point",160 as the matter of weight is for the inferior tribunal. If there
is no evidence at all on a material point, this is an error of law. But it is an
error within jurisdiction:
A justice who convicts without evidence is doing something that he ought not to
do, but he is doing it as a judge, and if his jurisdiction to entertain the charge
is not open to impeachment, his subsequent error, however grave, is a wrong
exercise of a jurisdiction which he has, and not a usurpation of a jurisdiction
which he has not.1 6 '

This means that the use of certiorari in aid of habeas corpus would
extend the scope of review to include an error of law within jurisdiction,
notably a finding based on no evidence at all. 1 62 Error of law may also arise
where the tribunal, though acting within its jurisdiction, makes a mistake in
interpreting the law.1 63 However, this is an unlikely ground on which to
attack a preliminary inquiry, given that the substantive guilt or innocence of
the accused is not there decided, but only whether the evidence is sufficient
in the justice's opinion to put him on trial.
If error of law on the face of the record (be it in wrongly deciding a
point of law or in deciding on no evidence at all) is reviewable, what constitutes "the record"? Lord Sumner found that the evidence does not form
part of the record and may not be examined by the superior court once
jurisdiction of the magistrate has been established. 6 4 But s. 478 of the
' 58 R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., [1922] 2 A.C. 128; 65 D.L.R. 1; [1922] 2 W.W.R.

30; 37 C.C.C. 129.
159 Id. at 156 (A.C.); 22-23 (D.L.R.); 53 (W.W.R.); 151 (C.C.C.).

1OId. at 144 (A.C.); 13 (D.L.R); 44 (W.W.R.); 141 (C.C.C.).
161Id. at 151-52 (A.C.); 19 (D.L.R.); 50 (W.W.R.); 147 (C.C.C.). This was
followed by McRuer, CJ.H.C. in Re Robinson, [1948] O.R. 487. A less traditional
approach was taken by O'Halloran, L.A. in Children's Aid Society of Catholic
Archdiocese of Vancouver v. Salmon Arm (City), [19411 1 W.W.R. 68 (B.C.C.A.)
wherein he found that a decision based on no evidence at all constituted a declining of
jurisdiction.
162 Seealso, D.W. Elliott, "No Evidence": A Ground of Judicial Review in Canadian Administrative Law? (1972-73), 37 Sask. L. Rev. 48 at 81-89 for a discussion on
whether "no evidence" goes to jurisdiction.
163R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw, [1952]

1 K.B. 338.
364Nat Bell, supra, note 158 at 165 (A.C.); 30 (D.L.R.); 61 (W.W.R.); 159
(C.C.C.).
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Criminal Code states that after committal for trial, a justice shall send forward "the information, the evidence, the exhibits, the statement if any of the
accused.. ." that he has in his possession. The section is entitled "Transmission of Record". In Botting the Ontario Court of Appeal held that s. 478
statutorily makes the evidence part of the record.16 5 Furthermore, in Ontario
s. 5 of the Act of 1866 ensures that in an application for habeas corpus with
certiorari in aid "all and singular the evidence.. ." shall be brought forward
so that "the sufficiency thereof to warrant such confinement or restraint" may
be determined, apparently expanding the normal scope of review by certiorari'06 beyond the narrow no-evidence rule. In Botting the court affirmed
the breadth of s. 5:
The purpose of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid clearly contemplates an
examination of the evidence taken in the inferior tribunal 67with the view of
determining its sufficiency to deprive the subject of his liberty.'
Pattersonappears to go counter to the orthodox approach as to review
68
on certiorari in that the Supreme Court majority, ignoring Northumberland
and Nat Bell, indicated that only lack of jurisdiction could ground a certiorari
application where review was sought of a committal for trial. However, that
was an Alberta case, so that in McGinnis, Wright, J. (as he then was) in the
High Court of Ontario held that the Act of 1866 providing for a writ of
certiorari in aid of habeas corpus enables an Ontario court to review the
committal for trial on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.169
But none of the preceding discussion takes into account the House of
Lords decision in Armah170 which further complicates these already difficult
principles. That was a habeas corpus application in an "extradition" matter
under the Fugitive Offenders Act. (Extradition is discussed in detail
below.) 171 An extradition judge conducts a hearing analogous to a preliminary inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to commit
the fugitive to await his return. Lord Reid agreed that whether or not there
was evidence to support a particular decision was always a question of law,
but not a question of jurisdiction. Yet he proceeded to state that it was open
165 Gordon, however, rejects the suggestion that s. 478 makes the evidence part of
the record, much less a record "of adjudication". Similar sections were present at the
time of Nat Bell, but Lord Sumner held they did not make depositions part of the
record.00 See Gordon, supra, note 140 at 71.
1 The normal scope is outlined by de Smith, supra, note 139 at 349-62.
107 Botting, supra, note 147 at 125 (O.R.); 29 (D.,.R.); 76 (C.R.); 378 (CC.C.).
108 Northumberland,supra, note 163.
169 McGinnis, supra, note 109. Furthermore, in R. v. Norgren (1973), 15 C.C.C.
(2d) 30; 25 C.R.N.S. 359 (B.C.S.C.), Anderson, 1. held that Patterson did not prevent
him from reviewing a committal by way of certiorari proceedings on the ground there
was no evidence at all on which to commit. In fact, he proceeded to quash the committal, noting that Judson, J. in Patterson stated he was confining his reasons within
the very narrow issues raised by the case.
170 R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Armah, [1968] A.C. 192; [1966] 3
W.L.R. 828; [1966] 3 All E.IL 177. For a case comment, see C. Thomberry (1967),
30 Mod. L. R. 197.
171 See text, infra, Part G (1).
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for the court to interfere on habeas corpus alone where there was insufficient
evidence to satisfy the test required to commit, notwithstanding the fact that
such an error would not deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction. However, he
qualified this by adding that there is a difference between the power of the
court to interfere with the committal of a prisoner to be sent out of the
jurisdiction and the power to interfere where there is a committal for trial
in England. There is "no trace of a court interfering with committal for trial
in this country on any ground other than lack of jurisdiction, nor, I apprehend, would certiorari be available to assist such interference". 172 Thus in the
extradition area, an application for habeas corpus alone will provide the
same relief as if certiorari in aid had been brought.
Similarly, Lord Pearce explains that the High Court has always had
the power by writs of habeas corpus and certiorari to correct any error of
law provided it could see that the error had occurred. In habeas corpus the
question was whether an error appeared on the return of the writ. The
"older, technical view" was that certiorari was required to remove the record.
However, "for at least 100 years the courts have accepted the depositions
and decision in place of a formal return of the writ, in cases where a writ of
certiorari would lie, without insisting on an additional writ to bring the
depositions before the court".' 7 3 Again, the proposition is advanced that on
habeas corpus alone, the relief given by certiorari will be granted, provided
it is a case "where a writ of certiorari would lie". Recall Lord Reid's position
that this last writ is not available where there is a committal for trial in England. Lord Upjohn also agreed that "in extradition cases" the superior court
can see whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the magistrate's
committal.
Armah, then, stands for the proposition that in the extradition area and
in any other case where a writ of certiorari would otherwise lie (but not in
committal for "domestic" trial), on an application for habeas corpus the
court will award the same relief as it would have had certiorari been brought
in aid, namely, for error of law within jurisdiction. Therefore, in Ontario if
an application for habeas corpus alone were brought to challenge a committal
for trial, Lord Reid would say that at common law certiorari would not lie.
However, the Act of 1866 statutorily makes it available. Thus Armah really
has little significance in Ontario, though in the provinces where there is no
statutory certiorari in aid, the court should award the same relief as if
certiorari had been brought (except that Lord Reid says that writ is not
available to interfere with a committal for trial). The question is whether one
can accept part of the holding in Armah without the rest, that is, accept that
certiorari in aid is automatic with habeas corpus, but reject the proposition
that certiorari cannot be obtained in committals for domestic trial.
In Ontario, then, upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus with
172

Armah, supra, note 170 at 235 (A.C.); 842 (W.L.R.); 188 (All E.R.). See,
also, R. v. Collins, [1970] 1 Q.B. 710 at 714-15.
i7 BArmah, supra, note 170 at 254 (A.C.); 858 (W.L.R.); 200 (All E.R.).

(Emphasis added).
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certiorari in aid, the applicant must show either a lack of jurisdiction,
invalidity of the detaining process upon its face, or insufficiency of evidence
on which to commit.
What constitute the bases upon which jurisdiction may be attacked? In
Feener174 the magistrate at a preliminary hearing for murder failed to give
the accused an opportunity to call witnesses. In an application for habeas
corpus with certiorari in aid to quash the warrant of committal, Wells, J. in
the High Court relied on what is now s. 469 of the Code ("the justice shall
ask the accused if he wishes to call any witnesses"). The accused was without counsel, although it was a preliminary hearing for murder, and the
magistrate failed to ask whether the accused wished to call any witnesses.
Wells, J. concluded that this failure deprived the magistrate of jurisdiction.
The committal was quashed, and pursuant to what is now s. 709, the court
directed that the matter be reheard by the magistrate, but did not free the
accused. The victory was somewhat Pyrrhic, except that the accused obtained another preliminary hearing.
In MishkoMh the accused applied for a writ of habeas corpus with
certiorari in aid following a committal after a preliminary hearing at which
the magistrate refused to allow counsel for the defence to call witnesses. (The
Crown had objected, as the witnesses the defence planned to call were to
be called by the Crown at trial). The committal was quashed, but an order
for the further detention of the accused was made. Hogg, J. held that there
was express provision in the Code permitting an accused to call witnesses on
"any matter relevant" to the inquiry.
In Churchman17 the application was grounded on the failure of the
magistrate to accord counsel for the defence the right to cross-examine a
Crown witness. The Code made express provision for cross-examination by
the defence. LeBel, J. held that the magistrate had exceeded his jurisdiction
and ordered the warrant of committal quashed and directed that the preliminary hearing be reopened. The accused were to remain in custody pending the new hearing. In each of the above cases the court treated the failure
to follow mandatory
statutory procedure as depriving the magistrate of
1
jurisdiction.
Turning now to what constitutes error of law and review of evidence: in
Plouffe 78 the accused was committed on a charge of murder but argued
there was only evidence of manslaughter. Wilson, J. held that:
The true rule is that if there is evidence to justify the Magistrate's decision - as
1

74R. v. Feener (1960), 129 C.C.C. 314 (Ont. H.C.).
175R. v. Mishko, [19461 3 D.L.R. 220; [1946] O.W.N. 131; 1 C.R. 7; 85 C.C.C.
410 (H.C.). For a case comment, see A.E. Popple (1946), 1 C.R. 11.
170R. v. Churchman and Durham, [19551 O.W.N. 90; 20 C.R. 137; 110 C.C.C.

382 (H.C.).
177 D.M. Gordon disagrees that failure to follow statutory procedure is fatal to
jurisdiction: (1928), 5 C.B.R. 407.
178 R. v. Plouffe and Warren, [1959] O.W.N. 30; 122 C.C.C. 291; 29 C.R. 297
(H.C.).
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contrasted with no evidence discretion for his.179

it will not be reviewed to substitute another

Similarly, in Cohen 80 Haines, J. felt he could not consider the "sufficiency
of the evidence", but only whether there was "any evidence at all" before the
extradition judge. As there was no evidence of the requisite intent, His Lordship found this, inter alia, to be an error of law on the face of the record and
quashed the warrant of committal. In Ontario the wording of the Act of 1866
would sustain a much broader review of the sufficiency of the evidence on
an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid; but in Plouffe and
Cohen, unlike Botting, the courts took the traditional Nat Bell18 ' approach
that the evidence may be reviewed only to determine whether there is a complete absence on a material point.
What gives rise to these applications by prerogative writ in the first place
is the absence of a right of appeal from a committal for trial. Should such a
right be enacted? There is danger in excessive review of preliminary determinations in limine litis. In most cases the accused will be on bail pending trial
anyway. At the same time, some of the preceding cases point out that abuses
may occur at the preliminary stage. Accordingly, the present procedure, in
Ontario at least, would appear to suffice. Restraint in the review of evidence
is necessary to ensure that the superior court will supervise and not retry the
case - if indeed "try" is the proper word at this stage of the proceedings.
There are ample safeguards for the protection of the accused at trial and a
right of appeal thereafter.
(4) After Committal for Trial where Indictment or Trial is Delayed

Section 6 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679182 provides relief by way of
habeas corpus in two situations: (1) if any person who has been committed
for trial on high treason or felony the first week of term or first day of sessions
of oyer and terminer or general gaol delivery has not been indicted sometime
in the next term/sessions, a judge may release the prisoner on bail unless
witnesses for the Crown could not be produced at the same term/sessions;
(2) if any person has been committed as above, but has not been indicted
and tried the second term after his commitment, he shall be discharged from
his imprisonment. Under s. 6, then, the Crown is required to indict at the
first assize after commitment and have the prisoner tried at the second. Bail
is the relief in the former case, 1 3 discharge in the latter. The policy behind
s. 6 is that the accused, having been committed for trial but not indicted, or
indicted but not tried, may be left "in limbo and not only forever tainted
179 Id. at 294 (C.C.C.); 30 (O.W.N.); 299 (C.R.). See, also, Norgren, supra,
note 169.
180 Re Commonwealth of Virginia and Cohen (No. 2) (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 262;
14 C.C.C. (2d) 174 (H.C.).
181 See supra,note 158 and text following that footnote.
182 Section 6 of the Act of 1679, as reprinted in the R.S.O. 1897, is actually s. 7
in the original Act of 1679. (See discussion supra, Part B(3).)
'8 3 R. v. Dean (1913), 3 W.W.R. 781; 18 B.C.R. 18; 11 D.L.R. 598; 21 C.C.C.
310 (B.C.S.C.).
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with guilt, but forever harassed by criminal proceedings begun but not disposed of". 1 84 At the time of the passage of the Act the protection of s. 6
varied greatly in England, depending upon where the prisoner was committed - anywhere from three months in London to two years in one of the
northern counties where the judges would only visit once a year. 185
Section 6 was applied in Chapman and Currie.'8 6 Currie was committed
for trial with his co-accused Chapman. The latter instituted proceedings to
quash his committal, thereby causing a delay in the joint trial. Currie, who
was released on bail the same day as his committal for trial, had always been
ready for trial. Since the original commitment, there had been two sittings
of a court of assize and this was the third sitting of the District Court Judge's
Criminal Court in Algoma. Vannini, D.C.J. suggested the Crown might have
applied to each of the two preceding sittings of the court or at the present
sittings for leave to defer or postpone the preferment of the indictment
because of the proceedings taken by Chapman. For the purposes of the
hearing, Currie surrendered himself into the custody of the court and was
ordered to be taken into institutional custody. The Crown argued that
Vannini, D.C.J. had no jurisdiction to make an order under s. 6 as his was
not a court of oyer and terminer or general gaol delivery. Vannini, D.C.J.
agreed that the Supreme Court of Assize was a court of oyer and terminer
and of general gaol delivery, but felt that to exclude the County and District
Courts would be a violation of the equality before the law guarantee in the
Canadian Bill of Rights. He accordingly held the Act of 1679 was to be so
construed and applied as not to abrogate that right of equality. Therefore, as
the wording of s. 6 is mandatory ("he shall be discharged from his imprisonment"), Vannini, D.C.J. so ordered and was affirmed by Stewart, J. of the
High Court.
In his analysis of the case, R.J. Sharpe queries the legal basis for the
court's holding. His Honour decided to fill in the gap caused by the lack of
reference to the County Courts in the Act. Sharpe notes that "the same gap
existed in the Act when it was passed in 1679 that the court claimed it was
plugging merely as a matter of modem interpretation". 187 In 1679 the English courts of quarter sessions were in existence, but the Act did not cover
persons coming before those courts.' 8 8 Sharpe also notes that the granting
of the prerogative writs has always been within the province of the common
law courts of superior jurisdiction, and "this may be the only case where
habeas corpus has been granted by the judge of an inferior court". 189
Finally, we should emphasize that Currie's victory was not complete.
He was ordered discharged from imprisonment. Of course he had not been
184 R. v. Chapman and Currie, [1971] 1 O.R. 601 (Dist. Ct.) at 606.
'85RJ. Sharpe, Case Comment (on Chapman and Currie) (1971-72), 14 Crim.
L.Q. 399 at 403.
186 Chapman, supra, note 184.

187 Sharpe, supra, note 185 at 407.
188 Quarter sessions are analogous to the present County Courts in Ontario.
189 Sharpe, supra, note 185 at 407.
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in jail to begin with, but on bail. The only reason he was in custody was to
enable him to apply for habeas corpus to be released from custody! All
rather useless. Vannini, D.C.J. left the committal for trial outstanding and
indicated the Attorney-General was at liberty to prefer an indictment, there
being no fetter on his power to do so, and the court having no authority to
quash the committals made or to dismiss the charges. 90 Actually Currie did
obtain a single advantage: he was discharged both from bail and from his
recognizances.
With the enactment of the Bail Reform Act,' 91 it is doubtful whether
Chapman is still good law (assuming it was good to begin with). Section 459
now provides for the review of detention where the trial is delayed after
the expiration of ninety days (for indictable offences) from the date of the
original bail hearing, thereby replacing the procedure in s. 6 of the Act of
1679. Furthermore, s. 459.1, provided it survives any attack based on s.
2(c) (iii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, expressly precludes resort to habeas
corpus. Accordingly, the Chapman decision must be read subject to these
recent legislative amendments.
(5) After Conviction and Sentence

The final stage in the criminal process at which habeas corpus may be
invoked is after conviction. The Act of 1866, however, does not extend to
persons imprisoned "by the conviction.., of any Court of Record, Court of
Oyer and Terminer or General Gaol Delivery, or Court of General Quarter
Sessions of the Peace.. .". This would exclude, as discussed earlier, convictions by the Supreme Court (as in Sproule or Darby'92 ) or by a County Court
on indictment (as in Martin and Lunan' 93 ) or perhaps even by a County
Court sitting on appeal from summary conviction. 94 As D.M. Gordon
observes:
The number of authoritative decisions against questioning county court judges'
convictions on indictment by certiorarior habeas corpus is such that the plenary
nature of such convictions must be regarded as settled in Canada.. .105

In the Goldhar 96 case after conviction by a County Court and dismissal of his appeal therefrom, the accused moved for a writ of habeas corpus
before Martland, J.in Chambers. When His Lordship refused to issue the
writ, Goldhar appealed to the full Supreme Court. In dismissing the appeal,
Fauteux, J. held that the functions of a writ of habeas corpus "do not extend
beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Court by which process the
190 In Smith, supra, note 128, Spence, J.held that when the Attorney-General has
preferred an indictment before the Grand Jury, "then no proceedings prior to that
indictment can affect the validity of the indictment or the committal thereon". See, also,
Pearson v. Lecorre (1972), 19 C.R.N.S. 26 (Que. Q.B.).
19 1 R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 2.
9
1 2 Sproule, supra, note 76; In re Darby, [1964] S.C.R. 64.
193 Martin, supra, note 87; Lunan, supra, note 88.
194

See text, supra, Part D(l).

195 Gordon, supra, note 85 at 303.
196 Goldhar,supra, note 25.
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subject is held in custody and into the validity of the process upon its face". 97
It is not the purpose of the writ to consider the evidence at trial: to do so
would convert habeas corpus into a writ of error or an appeal. Goldhar had
complained about the validity in law of the sentence that was imposed on
him. In a separate judgment, Cartwright, J. held that the question of the
maximum sentence available was for the judge in the Court of General Sessions of the Peace who had jurisdiction to decide; if he erred in law, the
proper course was to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 19 8
The jurisdictional ground was successfully raised in three British
Columbia cases. In each the applicant argued the warrant of commitment
based upon conviction did not disclose any offence known to law. In McLeodHenderson'0 9 McInnes, J. discharged an accused after examining a warrant
which was ambiguous as to whether the charge was theft or obtaining by false
pretences, and which in any event did not allege the name of the person
whose property was stolen.200 In Eustace201 Sullivan, J. held fatal to the
legality and validity of the warrant of committal the omission of the words
"to cause death or injury to any person" in what is now s. 331. His Lordship
declined to amend the warrant "for the obvious reason, I suppose, that the
defect therein is one of substance and not merely one of form".202 Furthermore, if the warrant of committal was made without jurisdiction by the
20 3
magistrate, then there was "nothing to amend". Finally, in Dudoward
Schultz, L.S.C. held the words "knowingly or wilfully" were essential elements of an offence under the Juvenile Delinquents Act. In these cases the
section number of the statute creating the offence was not stated in the
warrant of20 4committal. It is submitted that its inclusion would have cured
the defect.
As was stated by Lord Sumner in Nat Bell,20 5 sufficiency of evidence
does not go to jurisdiction, and accordingly it may not ground a habeas corpus
application. This was reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hender107Id. at 439 (S.C.R.); 409 (D.L.R.); 79 (C.R.); 348 (C.C.C.).
See, also,
Karchesky v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 547 at 551. As noted earlier, the formula must
be read subject to ss. 3-4 of the Act of 1866 which permit the court to inquire into the
truth of any return.
198 Goldhar, supra, note 25 at 440 (S.C.R.); 408 (D.L.R.); 80 (C.R.); 346

(C.C.C.).
190 R. v. McLeod-Henderson (1957), 21 W.W.R. 705; 118 C.C.C. 128; 26 C.R.
179 (B.C.S.C.).
200 Actually, the name of the owner need not be specified: Criminal Code, s. 512
(b); R. v. Van Hees (1957), 27 C.R. 14 (Ont. C.A.), although the Crown must prove
there was an owner or a person with a special property or interest in the thing stolen:

s. 283 (1)(a).
201

Re Eustace (1956), 19 W.W.R. 612; 116 C.C.C. 196; 25 C.R. 226 (B.C.S.C.).
Id. at 615 (W.W.R.); 199 (C.C.C.); 229 (C.R.).
3 Re Dudoward (1959), 28 W.W.R. 202; 124 C.C.C. 379; 30 C.R. 187 (B.C.S.C.).
2 4
0 R. v. Leclair, [1956] O.W.N. 336; 115 C.C.C. 297; 23 C.R. 216 (C.A.).
202
20

208

Nat Bell, supra, note 158.
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son.20 6 Rinfret, J. held that if "the magistrate had the right to enter on the

case, I am not to consider the sufficiency of the evidence on which he convicted" as that "does not raise the question of jurisdiction". 207 His Lordship
proceeded to quote from Lord Sumner's reasons in Nat Bell. Similarly,
Ritchie, C.J. in Trepanier'0 8 made it clear that if it was shown the magistrate
had no jurisdiction, the conviction could be quashed; but it was not the
purpose of habeas corpus to permit the superior court to retry the case for
that would provide:
...
the unseemly spectacle of this, the highest tribunal of the Dominion, turned
practically into a police court, to retry the case of every vagrant or keeper of a
disreputable house, who may be dissatisfied with the judgment of the police
magistrate . . . and who, of all others, should be dealt with summarily and
promptly, and in the interest of decency and morality .... The police magistrate
summarily disposes of the vagrant, and other simple offenders; if the present contention is maintained all any of these gentry, if convicted, would have to do,
would be to apply to a judge of this court, and have, as of right, his case
reheard . . . .209

The second ground of inquiry on habeas corpus is invalidity on the
face of the detaining process. 21 0 This was advanced in Bell and Hill21 before
Wilson, J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court. The prisoners were held
in custody under warrants of commitment issued by a stipendiary magistrate.
Such a magistrate has no right to take elections or to conduct trials; this can
only be done by one specially authorized to do so by the terms of his appointment.2 '2 "In the case of an inferior Court jurisdiction must not only exist, it
must be apparent on the face of the proceedings".213 The warrants in the case
at bar failed to show that the person who convicted and committed the
prisoners was a "magistrate" as defined in Part XVI of the Criminal Code;
hence they were defective and the prisoners illegally detained. If effort had
been made to prove that the magistrate was of the kind required by the
Code, the court indicated it would probably have ordered detention until
proper warrants were lodged. But it had no proof this magistrate "ever had
jurisdiction and, on the face of the warrant... he had not'.214
Even where a defect is shown, regard must be had to the privative provisions of Part XXIII of the Criminal Code dealing with "Extraordinary
Remedies". By virtue of s. 708, Part XXIII applies to habeas corpus and
certiorari proceedings. Section 716 states:
No warrant of committal shall, on certiorarior habeas corpus, be held to be
void by reason only of any defect therein, where (a) it is alleged in the warrant
206Ex parte Henderson; Ex parte Broder, [1930] S.C.R. 45; [1930] 1 D.L.R. 420;
52 C.C.C. 95.
207 Id. at 50 (S.C.R.); 424 (D.L.R.); 99 (C.C.C.).
20
8In
re Trepanier (1885), 12 S.C.R. 111.
209 Id. at 123.
'210 As expanded in Ontario by ss. 3-4 of the Act of 1866.
211R. v. Bell and Hill (1956), 25 C.R. 148 (B.C.S.C.).
212 See the present s. 482 of the Criminal Code.
13 Bell, supra, note 211 at 149.
214Id. at 150.
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that the defendant was convicted, and (b) there is a valid conviction to sustain
the warrant.
This privative section was argued in Bell and Hill. Wilson, J. held the "short
answer" to the contention that s. 716 barred review was that "the warrants
here do not know a valid conviction but, to the contrary, show on the face
of them invalid convictions". 215
In Ross216 Morand, I. of the Ontario High Court heard an application
for habeas corpus based on the allegation informations pursuant to which
the prisoners were tried failed to allege an essential averment, namely that
the accused did break and enter "for the purpose of committing an indictable
offence". His Lordship held the failure to include the words in quotes was not
"vital" but only a "defect"; he proceeded to invoke the present s. 716 and
dismissed the application. The omission of the words "did not deprive the
Magistrate of jurisdiction and he had the jurisdiction to enter the conviction
upon a guilty plea by the accused". He cautioned against "excessive technicality in connection with writs of habeas corpus".217 The object of the writ
is to keep courts within their jurisdiction, not to correct their errors; this
218
may be done by appeal.
Of course, an appeal is available after conviction. 219 The effect this may
have on the right to habeas corpus was considered in McIntosh,220 where the
accused obtained a writ of habeas corpus after conviction. Upon the return
of the writ to Fisher, l.A., the Crown objected that since there was a right
of appeal under the Criminal Code, that right should be exercised and not a
procedure by way of habeas corpus. The court refused to discharge the
accused, without prejudice to his right to appeal, reasoning that the appeal to
the County Court was the appropriate remedy in the circumstances.
In Ontario s. 5 of the Act of 1866 permits the issue of a writ of certiorari
in aid of any habeas corpus application. But s. 710 of the Criminal Code
reads:
No conviction or order shall be removed by certiorari (a) where an appeal was
taken... or (b) where the defendant appeared and pleaded and the merits were
tried, and an appeal might have been taken, but the defendant did not appeal. 221
215 Id. See, too, Ex parte Andrews (1973), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 43 (B.C.S.C.), wherein
Meredith, J. granted an application for habeas corpus where the warrant of committal
for default of payment of a fine after conviction failed to state the reasons for ordering
payment forthwith, as required by s. 722 (7) of the Criminal Code. His Lordship held
that s. 716 did not apply, as the irregularity here was much more than a simple defect
in form.
21
6 Ex parte Ross, [1969] 1 O.R. 271 (H.C.), affd [1969] 1 O.L 273.
217 Id. at 272.

2 18

Id.

210 Criminal Code,
22 0

ss. 603, 748.
Re McIntosh, [1943] 1 D.L.R. 752 (Ont. S.C.).
:221 Unlike s. 748, which provides an absolute right of appeal in summary offences,
s. 603 requires that leave be obtained in certain circumstances before an appeal will He
in indictable offences. Query whether the wording of s. 710 ("an appeal might have

been taken") extends to cover the case where there is no absolute right of appeal.
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In Sanders222 the Supreme Court of Canada had occasion to interpret this
section. Sanders was sentenced to preventive detention in 1958 and had
signed a waiver of his right to appeal. Eventually, in 1967 he made an application for a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to quash the warrant of committal. The Supreme Court (5-4) held that s. 710(b) barred the
application. Martland, J., speaking for the majority, refused to accept the
view that the section applied only where the court had jurisdiction. To do so
would deprive the section of any meaning. Its intent was to preclude the coexistence of two remedies in those cases to which it applied and to compel
review by appeal rather than certiorari.2 23 Therefore, in Ontario certiorari
in aid presumably may not be brought where s. 710 applies. 224 However,
habeas corpus is not excluded by s. 710, so that in Sanders the court proceeded to examine the refusal to grant a writ of habeas corpus (for which
s. 719(3) of the Code provides an express right of appeal), even though
s. 710 barred the certiorari application.
Of relevance too is s. 711 of the Code which purports to limit review
on certiorari by excluding convictions that are invalid by reason only of any
"irregularity, informality or insufficiency" where the court is satisfied that
an offence was committed and the court had jurisdiction to make the conviction. However, s. 711 would only rarely apply (insofar as it relates to
convictions), since s. 710 precludes the use of certiorari where an appeal is
available.
In sum, it is unlikely that habeas corpus would be sought after a conviction as the scope for review by way of appeal is much greater. Only where
the appeals have been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired will
there be any reason to resort to habeas corpus.
F.

DISPOSITION OF THE APPLICATION

(1) Orders Available
Section 3 of the Act of 1866 gives the court power to make an order
"discharging, bailing, or remanding the party" so that three possibilities are
available. As discussed earlier, habeas corpus was used to obtain bail at
common law. Bail is also the relief awarded under s. 6 of the Act of 1679225
where a person charged with a felony or treason has not been indicted within
the next term or sessions after his committal for trial. Furthermore, s. 709 of
the Criminal Code gives a judge certain powers where proceedings under
Part XXIII (which includes habeas corpus) have been instituted. He may
"make an order for the further detention of that person" and direct the judge
222 Sanders v. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 109; 10 D.L.R. (3d) 638; [1970] 2 C.C.C.
57. For case comments, see C.R. Thomson (1969-70), 12 Crim. L. Q. 111; W.A. Craig
(1970), B. C. Annual Law Lectures 1.
223 However, s. 710 does not apply to the Crown: R. v. Eross (1970), 73 W.W.R.

398; [1970] 5 C.C.C. 169 (B.C.C.A.). (The procedure for review of preventive detention
is in s. 694 of the Criminal Code.)
224
But see Thomson, supra, note 222.
225 S. 6 of the Act of 1679 as reproduced in the R.S.O. 1897. See note 182, supra.
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under whose warrant the prisoner is in custody or any other judge or magistrate to "take any proceedings, hear such evidence or do any other thing
that, in the opinion of the judge or court, will best further the ends of
justice".
It will be recalled that Plouffe226 involved an application to quash a
committal for trial on the ground of no evidence of murder, although there
was some evidence of manslaughter. Wilson, J. held that if it appears there
is no evidence upon which the magistrate could have arrived at his decision,
but there is additional evidence which the Crown could call that would supply
the deficiency, then the case should be sent back to the magistrate to take
further evidence and make another decision. The original committal should
be set aside, but the accused should remain in custody. In default of the
Crown producing further evidence, the accused should be discharged.
In Feener12- Wells, J. quashed the committal where the accused was not
afforded the right to call witnesses but did not free the accused, merely
directing that the magistrate rehear the matter. So too in Mishko228 Hogg, J.,
though quashing the committal, made an order for the further detention of
the accused so that there could be a new preliminary inquiry. The net result
is that where a committal following a preliminary inquiry is quashed for
failure to follow mandatory procedure, the accused will not be released from
custody; the matter will simply be remitted for a rehearing 2 2 9 On the other
hand, if the committal is quashed on the basis of no evidence, and it appears
further evidence will not be forthcoming, then the accused will be discharged.
As well, the Act of 1679230 provides that no person discharged on
habeas corpus shall again be imprisoned or committed for the same offence,
except by legal process or order of the court wherein he is bound by recognizance to appear or other court having jurisdiction of the cause. If anyone
knowingly contravenes this provision,
he "shall" forfeit the sum of five
231
hundred pounds to the prisoner. '
(2)

Costs

In Ange 2 - the Crown appealed from an order of Hughes, J. in habeas
corpus proceedings wherein the applicant was awarded costs. Laskin, J.A. (as
he then was) noted that historically costs in the common law courts rested
on statutory authority. While the Criminal Code, in what is now s. 713(1),
makes express provision for awarding costs in certiorari applications against
an unsuccessful applicant (but no corresponding power to award if he wins),
22

0 Plouffe, supra, note 178.

227 Feener,supra, note 174.
2
28 Mishko, supra, note 175.
220 See, too, Churchman, supra, note 176.
2390 S.
2 81

5 in the R.S.O. 1897; s. 6 in the original Act of 1679.
See Rogers, ed., Seager's Criminal Proceedings (3d ed. Toronto: Canada Law
Book Company Ltd., 1930) at 493-94.
2 32
Re Ange, [1970] 3 O.R. 153; [1970] 5 C.C.C. 371 (C.A.).
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there is no specific provision for habeas corpus costs. Laskin, J.A. felt the
court had no inherent power to create a special rule for costs in criminal
habeas corpus proceedings when there is no general substantive provision
for costs in criminal matters. Here certiorari was brought in aid of habeas
corpus, but233His Lordship felt this did not make s. 713 an "apt source of
authority".

Under s. 438(2) (c) the provincial superior courts may make rules relating to "proceedings with respect to mandamus, certiorari, habeas corpus,
prohibition, bail and costs.

. .

."

Laskin, J.A. was not prepared to decide

whether that section conferred substantive authority to permit costs in habeas
corpus applications. He referred to Christianson3 4 where Wilson, J.in the
British Columbia Supreme Court also found he had no power to award costs
against the Crown. He held that the present s. 438(2) (c) did not give the
court any power to make substantive law as to costs, only the ancillary power
to regulate costs. "To give a right to costs is to make substantive law; to
direct the manner of awarding and assessing costs is a matter of practice and
procedure." 235 As has been indicated, a substantive right is given for certiorari
applications in s. 713(1), but costs are not at present available in Ontario in
criminal habeas corpus proceedings.
(3) Appeals
Morden, J.A. in Johnston23 6 indicates that there was no appeal at common law in habeas corpus. Under the Act of 1866 s. 6 gave a right of appeal
to the "court of Error and Appeal". But after a lengthy history of the court
structure in Ontario, he concludes that not since 1913 has there been any
court in Ontario from which an appeal lies in a criminal habeas corpus matter
under that Act.
Since the Court of Appeal held that no appeal would lie, counsel for
the accused applied to another High Court Judge for discharge on the return
of a writ of habeas corpus (a similar application having been dismissed
earlier by Aylen, J., leading to the frustrated appeal to the Court of Appeal).
McRuer, C.J.H.C. rejected the proposition that counsel had a right to apply
from judge to judge until he had a decision in his favour - that would mean
that over thirty applications could be made. He held that Aylen, J.'s refusal
was issued in the name of the Supreme Court of Ontario and was a judgment
s7 decided that the common law right was not to go
of the Court. Hastings=
from judge
to judge but from court to court, so that the application was
238
refused.
28 3

1d. at 156 (O.R.); 374 (C.C.C.).

re Christianson, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 462; 3 W.W.R. 133; 13 C.R. 22; 100
C.C.C.
289
(B.C.S.C.).
23 5
1d. at 466 (D.L.R.); 137 (W.W.R.); 25 (C.R.); 293 (C.C.C.).
2341n

2386 Johnston, supra, note 33.

237 Re Hastings (No. 3), [1959] 1 All E.R. 698; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 454 (Ch. D.).
238
See A.F. Poole, Successive Application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus (1962),

2 O.H.LJ. 383; P.W. Schulman, The Ancient but Imaginary Right to go Round and
Round from Judge to Judge (1962), 1 Man. L.. 102.
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Fortunately the matter has now been remedied by statute. Section 719
of the Criminal Code allows an appeal from a refusal to the Court of Appeal,
and a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada - but there is no right
of appeal by the Crown if a writ of habeas corpus is granted. No application
may again be made on the same grounds whether to the same or another
court or judge unless fresh evidence is adduced. If a judgment is issued on
the return of the writ, an appeal lies by the applicant or the Crown to the
Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court of Canada with leave of that court.
G. OTHER AREAS WHERE HABEAS CORPUS IS AVAILABLE
(1)

Extradition

Where extradition is sought to a Commonwealth country, the Fugitive
Offenders Act2 39 governs; if to a non-Commonwealth nation, then the Extradition Act240 comes into play. Since there is no appeal from the order of an
extradition judge, s. 19 of the Extradition Act241 requires the judge who
commits a fugitive to prison to inform him he will not be surrendered to the
foreign state until after the expiration of fifteen days and that he has a right
to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. 242 Section 23 states that a fugitive shall
not be surrendered until after fifteen days have elapsed from the date of his
committal for surrender, or if a writ of habeas corpus is issued, until after
the decision of the court remanding him. If the fugitive has not been surrendered and conveyed out of Canada within two months of his committal
or the decision on any habeas corpus writ, any superior court judge who has
power to grant a writ of habeas corpus may order the fugitive to be discharged out of custody, unless sufficient cause is shown against such discharge. Extradition being a criminal matter,2 43 the same procedure applies
as for Criminal Code habeas corpus applications.
Two issues arise in the extradition area: the scope of review that is
available on habeas corpus 244 and the effect of s. 18 of the Federal Court
Act.241 In Cohen246 Haines, J. held that a "superior Court Judge sitting on a
habeas corpus application is limited to determining whether the extradition
Judge had jurisdiction to commit the applicant". But His Lordship proceeds
to state that if certiorari is brought in aid, the superior Court Judge may also
c. F-32.
0 R.S.C. 1970, c. E-21.
2
41 This is analogous to s. 13 of the Fugitive Offenders Act. (See, also, ss. 15-16).
242 The reason is that a fugitive who was not a British subject might not otherwise
know of habeas corpus. As well, the fugitive has a common law right extending beyond
the 15-day period to apply for the writ, provided, of course, that he has not been sent
out of the country. The leading authority on extradition is G.V. LaForest, Extradition
239 R.S.C. 1970,
24

To and From Canada (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1961) at 77, 80.
243 Wattebled, supra, note 65.
244 LaForest, supra, note 242 at 81-83, is highly recommended for a discussion of
this issue.
.24 R.S.C 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10.
246 Cohen, supra, note 180.
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consider "whether there has been any error of law on the face of the record",
2 47
for example, whether the double criminality requirement has been met,
whether there is a prima facie case that the fugitive committed the act charged,
and whether or not the crime is of a political nature. "[B]ut he may not look
at the sufficiency of evidence or substitute his own opinion or discretion for
248
that of the extradition Judge".
But an extradition judge is a "federal board, commission or other
tribunal" within the meaning of the Federal Court Act.2 49 Under s. 18 of that
Act, the Trial Division is given exclusive original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari against such tribunals. Haines, J. was of the view that if certiorari
is brought in aid of habeas corpus (to permit the judge hearing the application to examine the record of the proceedings), this "does not alter the fact
that this is essentially a habeas corpus application," and one by the terms of
s. 28 of the Extradition Act still within the sphere of the provincial superior
courts 28 0 A different view of the nature of certiorari in aid was taken by
51
Dryer, J. in Paterson.
To complicate matters further, let us recall that in Armah the House of
Lords held that in the extradition area (be it a proceeding under the Extradition Act or the Fugitive Offenders Act), on an application for habeas corpus
alone, the court will examine the record to see if there are any errors of law,
without requiring the issue of a writ of certiorari. This means that the problem caused by the Federal Court Act may be avoided if an Ontario court
decides that at common law it is entitled to look at the record on habeas
corpus alone to correct errors of law.
One possible error will be, as in Armah or Cohen, the lack of any evidence on which the magistrate could commit. There are, however, two different standards involved, as pointed out by their Lordships in Armah. Under
s. 18(1) (b) of the Extradition Act, the judge issues his warrant where "such
evidence is produced as would, according to the law of Canada... justify
his committal for trial, if the crime had been committed in Canada". But
under the Fugitive Offenders Act, s. 12 permits the magistrate to commit
only if "such evidence is produced as . . . according to the law ordinarily
administered by the magistrate, raises a strong or probable presumption that
the fugitive committed the offence mentioned in the warrant".252 This latter
test is of course the more onerous. As noted earlier, the House of Lords held
24

7 It must be shown that the offence involved is a crime both in the demanding
state and in Canada. See ss. 2(c) and 15 of the Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-21.
248 Cohen, supra,note 180 at 267 (O.R.); 179 (C.C.C.).
249 Re Milbury and The Queen (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 499; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 48
(N.B.C.A.).
250 Cohen, supra, note 180 at 266 (O.R.); 179 (C.C.C.). A similar approach was
taken by Kirby, J. in Ex parte Worlds (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 252 at 255 (Alta. S.C.).
251
Ex parte Paterson (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 84; 3 C.C.C. (2d) 181 (B.C.S.C.).
252 In England the Fugitive Offenders Act has now been modified so that the new
standard conforms to that of the Extradition Act: Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967,
c. 68, s. 7(5)(a).
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in Armah that if there is no evidence to satisfy the relevant test, the court
will interfere on habeas corpus alone.
Furthermore, in Cohen Haines, J. felt that the political nature of the
offence could be reviewed on habeas corpus. But in Armstrong Thurlow, J.
stated:
Moreover, since this Court does not have habeas corpus jurisdiction and since
the scope of review by this Court.. . is limited to consideration of the correctness in point of law of the action... I do not think it is open to this Court...
to enter upon... the question of the political character of the offences for the
purpose of determining the legality of the applicant's imprisonment as the English
Courts have
consistently done in extradition matters in habeas corpus
253
proceedings.

Under the English legislation, the magistrate and the superior court on habeas
corpus are each given express authority to determine the political nature of
the offence (as is the Secretary of State).254 Armstrong held that in Canada
the extradition judge may only receive evidence of the political nature of the
offence, but cannot decide the issue: that is for the Minister of Justice. Accordingly, since the extradition judge could not consider the political nature
of the offence, neither could the Federal Court, as it was limited to determining the validity in law of the extradition judge's actions. Therefore, in
Canada on a habeas corpus application to a provincial superior court, it is
submitted that the political nature of the offence is not subject to review
because of the difference in Canadian and English legislative provisions.
But under the Fugitive Offenders Act, although there is no "political
offence" defence (and indeed treason is specifically mentioned in s. 3 as an
offence to which the Act applies), s. 17 enables a superior court to discharge
the fugitive "absolutely or on bail" where it appears the case is of a "trivial
nature", the application for the return of the fugitive has not been made in
good faith, or it would otherwise be "unjust or oppressive" to return him. In
Armah Lord Pearce stated that the superior court does have power to consider matters relevant
to the English equivalent of s. 17 as part of the habeas
25
corpus application. 1
(2) Immigration
Immigration is a civil rather than criminal matter, so that habeas corpus
applications arising therefrom go through the provincial superior courts under
provincial law, in the absence of federal privative legislation.2 56 It has been
held that every alien admitted into Canada is entitled to the benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus to determine whether his detention for deportation is
25

Re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 265 (Fed. CA.)
at 283-84. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused.
254 Extradition Act, 1870, 33-34 Vict., c. 52, s. 3(1).
255
Armah, supra, note 170 at 256 (A.C.); 860 (D.L.R.); 201 (All E.R.).
But it has also been held that the political character of the offence is not a ground for
refusal to surrender: R.C. Keith, Asylum or Accessory: The Non-Surrender of Political
Offenders by Canada (1973), 31 U.T. Fac. L.R. 93 at 95.
256 See text, supra, Part C.
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according to law. 257 As in cases of arrest under criminal matters, on a habeas
corpus application the court will not inquire into any irregularity in the
caption of the applicant; the issue is whether he is now held under a proper
order.258
Section 22 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act2 9 gives the Board
"sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of fact
or law, including questions of jurisdiction". In Pringle v. Fraser260 the
Supreme Court of Canada held that this precluded resort to certiorari. In
Paterson2 6' an application was made for habeas corpus after a Special Inquiry
Officer ordered the applicant's detention under the Immigration Act. Certiorari
in aid was sought but refused by Dryer, J. in the British Columbia Supreme
Court, who held that s. 22 excluded the availability of that remedy. This
finding, that habeas corpus with certiorari in aid involved two separate proceedings, should be contrasted with that of Haines, J. who in Cohen treated
certiorari in aid as part of the habeas corpus application. 262
(3) Parole
A detailed analysis of the Parole Act265 and the Penitentiary Act2 " is
beyond the scope of this paper,26 5 but habeas corpus is one method used to
challenge the revocation of parole. Since the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Canada in McCaud 66 it seems clear that in revocation proceedings, the
parolee is not entitled to a hearing in accordance with the principles of natural
justice.2 67 Accordingly the ground on which habeas corpus is commonly
257
258

Vaaro v. The King, [1933] S.C.R. 36; [1933] 1 D.L.R. 359; 59 C.C.C. 1.

Fong Goey Jow, supra, note 122.
259 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-3.
2 60
Pringle v. Fraser, [1972] S.C.R. 821; 26 D.L.R. (3d) 28. For a case comment,
see D.W. Elliott (1972), 7 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293.
261 Paterson, supra, note 251.
262 See, too, Ex parte Tirey (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 475 (Alta. S.C.) and Ex pare
Hosin, [1970] 3 O.R. 268; 12 DJL.R. (3d) 704 (H.C.), wherein Wright, J. (as he then

was) alludes to this problem at 706-07 (D.L.R.). There may be a difference between

habeas corpus with statutory certiorari in aid (as under the Ontario Act of 1866) and
habeas corpus with a common law application for certiorari brought at the same time:
see Cameron Harvey (1966), The Lmv of Habeas Corpus in Canada (unpublished
LL.M. thesis, York University Law Library).
2
63 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2.
264
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6.
265
One article of interest in this area is by K. Jobson, Fair Procedure in Parole
(1972), 22 U.T.LJ. 267.
266
Ex parte McCaud, [1965] 1 C.C.C. 168; 43 C.R. 252 at 170n, (C.C.C.); 256
(C.R.). See, also, Howarth v. National Parole Board (1975), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 385

(S.C.C.).
26 7

Ex parte Beauchamp, [1970] 3 0.R. 607; 1 0.0.C. (2d) 101 (H.C.); Ex parte
Marcotte (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 114 (Ont. C.A.), rev'd (1975), 18 C.C.C. (2d)

257 (S.C.C.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 13, NO. I

sought is miscalculation of the sentence that remains to be served, a matter
2 68
that will not be examined here.
It has been held that the National Parole Board, the director of a
penitentiary and the Commissioner of Penitentiaries are federal tribunals
within the meaning of the Federal Court Act, 269 as is the warden of a penitentiary.2 70 Thus where certiorari in aid of habeas corpus is sought, we again
encounter the issue of whether s. 18 of the Federal Court Act vests exclusive
jurisdiction in that Court with respect to that writ.271 If the applicant is not
incarcerated, but wishes to challenge conditions of suspension to which he
is subject, habeas corpus would not avail, and recourse would thus be to the
Federal Court.2 72
(4) Mental Health:
Federal Legislation
Habeas corpus is used where a person has been detained in a mental
institution pursuant to provisions of the Criminal Code.273 In summary
offences, under s. 738 the court may at any time before conviction remand
the defendant by order in writing for observation for a period not exceeding
thirty days if it is of the opinion, supported by at least one duly qualified
medical practitioner's evidence, that the accused is mentally ill. A physician's
testimony is not needed "where compelling circumstances exist" and one is
not available. Detention for up to sixty days may be ordered with at least
one physician's evidence. At a preliminary inquiry, a justice may make a
similar order pursuant to s. 465. At trial, a court may at any time up to
verdict direct an issue to be tried whether the accused is unfit to stand trial
on account of insanity. The same 30/60 day rule applies here. Finally, s. 546
permits the Lieutenant-Governor of a province to order any person who is
in custody in a prison in that province to be removed "to a place of safekeeping" if satisfied the prisoner is mentally deficient.
This last section was involved in Kleinys274 and led to an application for
habeas corpus to secure the release of a person detained at the discretion of
the Lieutenant-Governor. Ruttan, i. in the British Columbia Supreme Court
dismissed the application on the grounds that (1) there was no evidence of
268 See Ex parte Newfield (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 222 (Alta. S.C.); Ex parte Hudon

(1973), 12 C.C.0. (2d) 236 (Que. C.A.); Ex parte Marcotte, supra, note 267.
200
Ex parte Hinks, [19721 3 O.R. 182; 27 D.LR. (3d) 593; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 316
(H.C.).
27 0
Re Greene and Faquy, [1972] 3 O.R. 395; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 297; 7 C.C.C. (2d)
388 (H.C.); but see Ex parteKolot (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (B.C.S.C.) at 422.
271

In Kolot, supra, note 270, Anderson, J. held that the word "certiorari" in s. 18

does not mean "certiorariin aid of habeas corpus".
272
Supra, note 269 at 186 (O.R.); 597- (D.L.R.); 320 (C.C.C.).
273

La

See K. Jobson, Commitment and Release of the Mentally Ill Under Criminal

(1968-69), 11 Crim. L.Q. 186.
2 4

7 Ex parte Kleinys (1965), 49 DJ..R

102 (B.C.S.C.).

(2d) 225; 46 C.1. 141; [1965] 3 C.C.C.
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any arbitrary exercise of discretion, so that the court was powerless to substitute its discretion for the Lieutenant-Governor's; (2) though it may have
been improper to move the prisoner between the time of the original detention and the time when the motion for the writ was launched to other jails,
the original committal order was not thereby invalidated. 75
On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus was issued in Somme- 76 by
Ouimet, J. in the Quebec Superior Court who held that the provisions of the
present s. 465 had not been observed: there was no evidence of a qualified
medical practitioner before the justice, his qualifications not having been
established; the justice made an oral remand and not one in writing as he was
required to do; the petitioner was deprived of "his unquestionable right to
cross-examine the witness for the prosecution", together with several other
errors which the court concluded were so substantial as to be fatal. Hence the
remand of the petitioner was null and void.2 77
ProvincialLegislation

Committals for mental illness also arise pursuant to provincial legislation.
Under the Ontario Mental Health Act a person may become a patient in a
mental hospital (other than through the criminal process) by voluntary
action, by involuntary commitment after an examination by a physician, by
means of an information being lodged with a justice of the peace requiring
psychiatric examination, or by a peace officer who may take a person acting in
a disorderly manner to a psychiatric facility if he is apparently suffering from
mental disorder.278 There are various review procedures in the Act that are
directed to obtaining release.279 The only point that need be made here is
that habeas corpus is also available and is probably the quickest way to
obtain freedom. In Carnochan280 the applicant sought release from the Ontario Hospital at Brockville. Upon his appeal to the Court of Appeal, that
court reserved judgment and directed he be examined separately by two
doctors appointed by the court, not connected with any Ontario Hospital for
persons mentally ill. After the doctors made their reports, the appeal was dismissed, as was a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The last
court held the appellate court had power to proceed as it did in ordering
the medical reports. Consideration of these satisfied the Supreme Court that
the proper order had been made. In other words, what mattered was whether
the applicant was mentally ill at the time of the habeas corpus hearing, not

whether the original commitment was regular.
As well, under s. 15 of The Mental Health Act, where a person in
custody charged with an offence appears before a judge and suffers from
275

1d. at 235 (D.LR.); 152 (C.R.); 113 (C.C.C.). This is analogous to illegal

arrest, i.e. caption is irrelevant if present detention is justified.
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Re Sommer (1958), 27 C.R. 243 (Que. S.C.).
277 See, also, Fawcett v. A.-G. Ont. (1964), 44 C.R. 201 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.O. 1970, c. 269, ss. 7-10.
27 9
Ss. 26-30.
28ORe Carnochan, [1941] S.C.R. 470, aff'g [1940] O.R. 310; [1940] 3 D.L.R. 412.
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mental disorder, he may be remanded for a mental examination for up to two
months. Such an order was made in Branco.281 Addy, J., hearing an application for an order in lieu of a writ of habeas corpus and for an order quashing
the remand, held that an accused who is before the Court for the purpose
of his trial on a criminal charge is within the custody of that Court for purposes of s. 15. It is immaterial whether he was free on bail or held in actual
custody immediately prior to his appearance. In dismissing the application,
Addy, J. held that the function of the Court was not to review the exercise
of discretion of the Provincial Court Judge, but merely to decide whether
there were grounds on which such discretion could be reasonably exercised.
Here the applicant failed to discharge the onus that lay on him to establish
there was no evidence on which the lower court could properly have acted.
The approach in Carnochan indicates the wider involvement of the
courts in dealing with habeas corpus in mental health cases than in criminal
cases. Surely this is one area where the person detained should have every
opportunity to regain his liberty, given the perhaps too easy way in which that
liberty may be lost under such commitments.282
(5) Infants
Under s. 2(1) of The Infants Act2 88 the father and mother of an infant
are equally entitled to his custody, control and education. As all infants are
held in custody, the remedy of habeas corpus is available where a child is
being unlawfully detained. The advantage of this procedure over others is its
speed, although several
alternative remedies are available to assert rights of
284
custody over a child.
8 5 approved of
The Supreme Court of Canada in Stevenson v. Florant2
the propriety of habeas corpus as a remedy for a parent seeking to recover the
custody of his child. A mother sought return of her daughter from the latter's
grandfather who had been appointed the child's tutor under Quebec law.
Rinfret, J. found it was "undeniable that the fact of a child being in the
custody of a person other than its legal guardian, has been treated as a
restraint of the child's liberty". 286 If a child who is not of years of discretion 87 is taken from the legal custody of his parents, this may be considered as an imprisonment. Where the custody of children is involved, the
281

parte Branco, [1971]3 O.R. 575 (H.C.).
See, also, Trenholm v. A.-G. Ont., [19401 S.C.R. 301; [1940] 1 D.L.R. 497; 73
C.C.C. 129.
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R.S.O. 1970, c. 222.
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One may apply under s. 1 of The Infants Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 222; under s.
3(3) of The Deserted Wives and Children's Maintenance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 128; or
under ss. 10-11 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8.
285 Stevenson v. Florant, [1925] S.C.R. 532; [1925] 4 D.L.R. 530, aff'd [1927] A.C.
211; [1926] 4 D.L.R. 897; 46 C.C.C. 362.
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courts are more liberal in granting writs of habeas corpus than in other
cases, exercising powers somewhat analogous to those of the Court of
Chancery as parens patriae.2 88 The court will look to289the welfare of the child
in determining who should have lawful custody of it.
Certain procedural aspects of habeas corpus in infant cases were examined in Agar.2 90 Pickup, C.J.O. made it clear that the original of the writ
must be served on the person commanded to make a return. More important
is the matter of what happens when the person ordered to produce the body
fails to do so, simply because he does not have it.
Before the writ may issue to any person, there must be a prima facie
case of custody or power. But it is for the court upon the return of the writ
to determine whether or not the persons to whom it is directed have in their
custody or power the body of the person which the writ requires to be
brought before the court. "This does not mean that the persons to whom
such a writ is directed ... must produce the infant before the Court, but it
does mean that they must do that or show cause why they cannot do So"1.291
Habeas corpus might also be used where a child has been found to be
in need of protection under The Child Welfare Act 292 and been declared a
Crown Ward or otherwise taken from his parents who could presumably
question the validity of the detention. Such a procedure (with certiorari in
aid) was tried in British Columbia in Perepolkin.2 93 Though the court quashed
the order of committal, it then embarked on its own investigation. The result
was a decision that the Doukhobour parents were not entitled to rely on a
freedom of religion argument as justification for not sending
their child to
school, and accordingly, they were not fit to receive custody.294
H. PROCEDURE-9 5
(1) Federal
In Ontario the Criminal Appeal Rules now outline the procedure that
should be followed in habeas corpus proceedings. 296 Formally there is a twostage process: (1) the application, by originating notice, to a Supreme Court
Judge in Chambers for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus to the keeper of
the jail, directing him to produce the body before a Supreme Court Judge,
2
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Id.

289 McKee v. McKee, [19511 A.C. 352; [1951] 2 D.L.R. 657.

290Re Agar, [1956] O.W.N. 140 (CA.).
291 Id. at 144.
292
R.S.O. 1970, c. 64. But see issues raised by F.M. Fraser, "Children in Need of
Protection" in I Studies in CanadianFamily Law, supra, note 287, 67 at 99.
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Perepolkin v. Supt. of Child Welfare for B.C. (1957), 23 W.W.R. 592

(B.C.C.A.).
See, also, Worlds, supra, note 250.
generally, Salhany, supra, note 111 at 91, 291-93, 328-31.
Enacted pursuant to s. 438 of the Criminal Code on May 7, 1973, effective
Sept. 1, 1973. Rules 11-13 relate to habeas corpus.
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295 See,
296
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together with the warrant or other document which purportedly justifies the
applicant's detention; (2) upon the return of the writ, a hearing on an application for discharge, on the basis the prisoner is unlawfully detained. Upon
return of the writ pending hearing, the applicant is held not under authority
of the general warrant, but under authority of the writ and he may be bailed
or remanded in the discretion of the court.297 Notice of the application must
be served on the person having custody of the applicant and on the AttorneyGeneral.2 98 The application must be accompanied by the applicant's affidavit
that he is held in actual custody, that he believes his detention is unlawful,
and that he is detained for no other reason or cause. 29 9 A copy of the order
under which he is detained should be attached as an exhibit to the affidavit,
and both should be served together with the notice of motion.
Concurrently, an application by originating notice is made (having the
same effect as a writ of certiorari in aid) to direct the bringing before the
judge, at the same time as designated for the original return, the evidence
and all proceedings taken concerning the confinement so that their sufficiency
to warrant the detention may be examined. The purpose of certiorari in aid
is explained by Sidney Smith, l.A. in Perepolkin:
Where a person in custody applies for a habeas corpus he is usually imprisoned
under a conviction. Habeas corpus only questions the authority for detention
which is the gaoler's warrant. If this is . . . valid on its face and recites a conviction valid on its face a habeas corpus alone is useless. If the prisoner wishes
to attack the conviction as being invalid for reasons not shown on its face he
must get rid of the conviction by quashing it through certiorariproceedings. 3 00

(However, this must now be read subject to Armnah where the House of
Lords held that full relief may be had on habeas corpus alone, if certiorari

would otherwise lie.) When the return is made, the application for discharge
is argued, all the necessary material now being before the court.3 0 Though
the above two-stage process applied in theory, the practice was for the
parties to consent to treat the application for the writ as an application for
discharge and the whole matter was dealt with at one hearing.302 This is now
expressly dealt with by Criminal Appeal Rule 13, which also permits parties
to consent to dispense with the necessity of the body of the applicant.
Formerly it was also possible to apply to a single Judge of the Supreme
Court of Canada for a writ of habeas corpus (except in extradition cases).
This procedure has now been repealed.30 3
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301 Hartt, supra, note 47 at 320.
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Finally, s. 17(5) of the Federal Court Act 0 4 gives the Trial Division
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear an application for a writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum in relation to any member of the Canadian Forces
serving outside Canada. This implies that if a soldier is within the country,
his recourse is to the provincial courts. In s. 18(a) where the Trial Division
is given exclusive original jurisdiction over the various prerogative writs,
including certiorari, habeas corpus is conspicuously absent. The reasons for
leaving habeas corpus with the provincial courts are probably twofold: this
writ would be the one most zealously guarded by them of all the prerogative
writs as it deals with the liberty of the subject; and secondly, the provincial
courts are more accessible in situations of urgency.2 0 5
(2) Provincial0 6
The present Ontario Habeas Corpus Act applies where any person is
deprived of his liberty, except one imprisoned by order of the Supreme Court,
court of general sessions of the peace, or other court of record. One may
apply to a judge of the Supreme Court under s. 1 (1). If it appears by
affidavit there is reasonable and probable ground for complaint, the judge
"shall" award a writ directed to the person who has custody, returnable immediately before the same or other judge of the Supreme Court. Wilful
neglect or refusal to answer the writ may lead to contempt proceedings. 3 07
Rule 209(11) of the Rules of Practice provides that applications for and
on the return of a writ of habeas corpus shall be disposed of in Chambers.
Notice must be given to the Attorney-General 48 hours beforehand, and he
is entitled as of right to be heard upon the application. 0 8 Under s. 5 the court
"may direct the issue of a writ of certiorari"in aid to have returned "all the
evidence, depositions, conviction and all proceedings had or taken" concerning the confinement. On the return of the writ, s, 6 provides that where a
person is alleged to be detained by reason of a conviction of an inferior
tribunal, the court must determine if the person has been convicted of any
offence against the law "and that there is any evidence to sustain the conviction". If the conviction is "irregular", the court has power to amend the
offence, where the evidence supports this. An appeal lies to the Divisional
Court.
The Judicial Review ProcedureAct,30 9 in s. 2(1), provides a simplified
procedure for relief under the prerogative writs, except for habeas corpus.
Section 12(2) makes it clear that "Nothing in this Act affects proceedings
under The Habeas Corpus Act or the issue of a writ of certiorari thereunder",
80

4 R.S.C. 1970, (2nd Supp.), c. 10.
205 See text, supra,Part G(1) for a discussion of certiorari and habeas corpus-under

this Act.
306For precedents see W.B. Williston, Precedents in -Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1965) at 639-49.

o7 R.S.O. 1970, c. 197, ss. 3-4.
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but an application for judicial review may be brought in aid of an application
for habeas corpus.3 10 Therefore one can either use habeas corpus with certiorari, or habeas corpus plus judicial review. It may be noted that s. 12
specifically deals with the certiorari in aid problem, unlike s. 18 of the
Federal Court Act.
Thus where incarceration occurs in relation to provincial criminal offences (for example, The Highway Traffic Act, The Liquor Control Act),
then the provisions of the Ontario Act would apply.311 Earlier, when we
discussed s. 710 of the Criminal Code, we noted the problem that might
ensue where certiorari is brought in aid of habeas corpus in Ontario.31 2 A
similar difficulty arises by virtue of The Summary Convictions Act31 3 which
states that no order or conviction shall be removed into the Supreme Court
by a writ of certiorari if the defendant has appealed from such order or conviction. Thus habeas corpus alone would presumably continue to be available,
but not certiorari. Apart from express appeal provisions in The Summary
Convictions Act, The JudicatureAct31 4 also provides a procedure by motion
to quash a conviction that replaces the writ of certiorari.
I.

CONCLUSION

We have seen the many ways in which habeas corpus is used to review
the validity of detentions, be they under criminal or civil process. We have
also seen the limits that circumscribe this writ. It is not an appeal but an
extraordinary remedy, designed to correct extraordinary wrongs, and not
mere technicalities or formalities.
Is there still need for habeas corpus? With the various appeal provisions
that are available, together with the other prerogative writs, some would say
there is little that habeas corpus adds to the law. True, it is not barred by
time limits, as are appeals; and its speed and versatility have always been
its strength.
But the greatness of Magna Carta lies not so much in what it says, but
in what people think it says. We feel better because there is a Canadian Bill
of Rights, even though we may be unsure of its exact purport. So too with
habeas corpus: society feels more secure, knowing there is resort to this
great remedy. Its very presence breeds confidence in the administration of
justice; its removal would bring cries of tyranny. There will always be a
need for habeas corpus. For it is a symbol of ultimate right, of ultimate
justice.
310 See comment in I C.E.D. (Ont.) (3d) at 3-133, note 81.
811
Hartt, supra, note 47 at 317.
312
See text, supra, Part E(5).
818R.S.O. 1970, c. 450, s. 20(3).
314
R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, ss. 69-70.

